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RAZING THE PATENT BAR
William Hubbard*
Innovation is vital to economic prosperity, and lawmakers consequently strive to
craft patent laws that efficiently promote the discovery and commercialization of
new inventions. Commentators have long recognized that legal fees are a
significant cost affecting innovation, but remarkably a crucial driver of these costs
has largely escaped scrutiny: the Patent Bar. Every year innovators spend billions
of dollars on legalfees for representation in the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
("USPTO"), where inventors apply for patents and potential infringers seek to
invalidate issued patents. Supply in this essential egal services market, however,
is sharply limited because patent law requires innovators to select representation
from the ranks of the Patent Bar, which only extends membership to persons with
extensive technical educations, like engineering degrees. Although this educational
requirement bars entry in a market that is critical to innovation, scholars,
lawmakers, and commentators have largely ignored this feature of the Patent Bar.
This Article begins to fill this void and demonstrates that the technical-education
requirement of the Patent Bar lacks economic justification. This Article explains
that a trade-off lies at the heart of efficient occupational icensing: licensing
creates harmful barriers to entry in regulated markets, but can also improve the
quality of services offered in that market, thus helping those markets to function
more effectively. In the case of the Patent Bar, however, service quality
improvements have not been-and likely cannot be-shown to justify the
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deleterious market effects. Paradoxically, the USPTO's misguided efforts to
ensure quality service actually threatens to undermine innovation by raising the
cost ofpatent acquisition and other services in the USPTO.
Accordingly, this Article proposes that the labor market for representation in the
USPTO be expanded by making lawyers without technical educations eligible to
join the Patent Bar. This Article details barriers to this proposal, including the
revolving-door relationship between the USPTO and the Patent Bar. In light of
these concerns, this Article recommends avenues for effecting the proposed
reforms.
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INTRODUCTION
Innovation is critical to the vitality of the U.S. economy, and patent law is
one of the primary legal tools for promoting innovation.) Patent law promotes
investment in discovering and commercializing new inventions by giving
inventors exclusive rights to their discoveries.2 Unfortunately, however, patent law
1. William Hubbard, The Competitive Advantage of Weak Patents, 54 B.C. L.
REv. 1909, 1910 (2013).
2. See 35 U.S.C. § 271 (2012).
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also imposes certain costs on both innovators and society. For example, patent
litigation often costs patent owners and alleged infringers millions of dollars in
legal fees.3 Moreover, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office ("USPTO")
frequently issues invalid patents, which causes businesses to face substantial costs
when they are accused of infringing such patents, particularly because issued
patents are presumed valid in lawsuits until proven otherwise by clear and
convincing evidence.4 Maximizing economic efficiency is thus the central problem
in patent law today.5 Accordingly, commentators, lawmakers, and scholars attempt
to craft reforms that substantially reduce costs while largely preserving the benefits
of the patent system. For instance, Congress recently considered bills designed to
reduce the legal costs of patent litigation.6
Curiously, little attention has been paid to one of the key drivers of the
legal costs facing inventors and potential infringers: the Patent Bar. Each year,
inventors spend approximately $9 billion on legal fees related to filing patent
applications in the USPTO,7 and patent owners and their competitors together
3. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW. ASS'N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY
2013, at 34-38 (2013) [hereinafter AIPLA 2013].
4. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2012); Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 97
(2011).
5. See MICHELE BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL
MONOPOLY 158 (2008) (describing the traditional view of patent law); DAN L. BURK &
MARK A. LEMLEY, THE PATENT CRISIS AND HOW THE COURTS CAN SOLVE IT 7 (2009) ("The
idea behind the patent system is simple: invention is a 'public good' because it is expensive
to invent but cheap to copy those inventions."); F. SCOTT KIEFF ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF
PATENT LAW 64-68 (6th ed. 2013); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE
ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 4 (2003) ("Today it is
acknowledged that analysis and evaluation of intellectual property law are appropriately
conducted within an economic framework that seeks to align that law with the dictates of
economic efficiency."); ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW
TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 127 (4th ed. 2007) ("Patent law provides a market-driven incentive to
invest in innovation, by allowing the inventor to appropriate the full economic rewards of
her invention."); Clarisa Long, Patent Signals, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 625, 629 n.11 (2002)
(citing "literature [that models] intellectual property in terms of rents and product markets,"
and stating that a complete list of such citations "would be impossible here"); Ted
Sichelman, Commercializing Patents, 62 STAN. L. REV. 341, 357-58, 377 (2010)
(describing the "reward" of exclusive patent rights as a "dominant justificatory theor[y] of
patent law" that "largely motivates current patent doctrine"); Katherine J. Strandburg, Users
as Innovators: Implications for Patent Doctrine, 79 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 470 (2008)
("[D]iscussions of patent law and policy have for the most part remained rooted in the
paradigm of commercial sale as motivation for invention, disclosure, and dissemination of
technical advances.").
6. E.g., Innovation Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015); The Protecting American
Talent and Entrepreneurship Act (PATENT Act), S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015).
7. In 2001, Mark Lemley estimated the total annual cost of domestic patent
prosecution at $4.33 billion based on the following: (1) a "conservative average estimate of
$20,000 per initial application taken through prosecution"; (2) a "conservative cost estimate
of $5,000 per continuation application"; (3) an estimated 28.4% of patents being
continuation patents; and (4) a total of 275,000 patent applications being filed. Mark A.
Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 1495, 1499 (2001). In
2014 and 2015, inventors filed 578,802 and 589,410 patent applications, respectively.
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spend more than $600 million dollars each year on administrative procedures
challenging the validity of issued patents in the USPTO. With all dollar figures in
the thousands, Table 1 summarizes this calculation.8
4,220 $125 1,737 $217,125 1,565 $195,625
Responses $125 1,326 $165,750 1,238 $154,750
Motion 2,216 53% $104 912 $189,723 822 $170,937
Practice
"I"kB 1,441 34% $105 593 $124,558 534 $112,224
I)ecision
Tlotal - - $697,156 - $633,535
Table 1: Summary of Annual Cost of Administrative Challenges (in thousands)
The group of legal specialists receiving these fees is relatively small
because only members of the Patent Bar are allowed to represent inventors in the
USPTO, U.S. PATENT STATISTICS CHART CALENDAR YEARs 1963 - 2015 (June 15, 2016),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/usstat.htm. Updating Lemley's
calculation with these current application numbers provides yearly estimates of more than
$9 billion spent by inventors on patent prosecution each year.
8. The lion's share of administrative patent challenges in the USPTO are inter
partes reviews. USPTO, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 (Jan. 31, 2017),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/aia statisticsj anuary2017.pdf.
Determining the amount spent on legal fees in these proceedings is difficult, in part because
the cost of an inter partes review naturally depends on the duration of the dispute. An inter
partes review begins with a patent challenger filing a petition with the USPTO. 35 U.S.C. §
311(a) (2012). The patent owner may file an opposition but is not required to do so. Id. §
313 (2012). If the USPTO initiates proceedings, the case enters a motion practice stage. See
37 C.F.R. §§ 42.120-42.123 (2016). Ultimately, the dispute will be resolved by the Patent
Trial and Appeal Board ("PTAB"), in some cases following a hearing. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316,
318 (2012). The USPTO reports the number of inter partes review petitions filed each year
and the number of oppositions to those petitions. USPTO, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD STATISTICS supra. For recent years, the USPTO also provides aggregate data on the
number of inter partes reviews that have been instituted and thus reached the motions stage
and the number of proceedings that have been resolved by the PTAB. Id. Using this data,
the percentages of inter partes review petitions that generate proceedings that reach the later
stages can be calculated. When combined with the number of petitions filed each individual
year, these percentages provide an estimate of the number of proceedings that reach the later
stages of inter partes reviews. To calculate legal costs, the number of inter partes reviews
that reach different stages can be multiplied by the average litigation costs for each stage.
The American Intellectual Property Law Association provides these average litigation costs
based on surveys from practicing lawyers. AM. INTELLECTUAL PROP. LAW. ASS'N, REPORT
OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 2015, at 1-139 (2015) [hereinafter AIPLA 2015]. Some of these
costs must be doubled as both sides in an IPR incur these costs.
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USPTO.9 Since its formation in the early part of the twentieth century, the USPTO
has admitted around 70,000 members to the Patent Bar, but less than 45,000 are
currently registered as "active." 0 Moreover, due to retirement and death, the
number of Patent Bar members who are actually representing clients in the USPTO
is closer to 26,000." Many of these members have no formal legal training
because, unlike other legal bars, a law degree is not required for Patent Bar
membership. Nonlawyers who join the Patent Bar are called "patent agents" and
are permitted to perform all of the same services in the USPTO as patent
attorneys.1 2
The small size of the Patent Bar is surprising, given the powerful
economic incentives that exist to join the Patent Bar." The average patent
practitioner can likely expect to receive more than $300,000 in legal fees each
year.14 Indeed, in recent years both patent agents and patent attorneys have been
identified as one of the "100 Best Jobs in America," with median salaries of
9. 37 C.F.R. § 11.10 (2016). There are limited exceptions to the requirement
that a person be a member of the Patent Bar to represent an inventor in patent proceedings
before the USPTO. For example, "[a]ny individual not registered under § 11.6 may, upon a
showing of circumstances which render it necessary or justifiable ... be given limited
recognition ... to prosecute as attorney or agent a specified patent application or specified
patent applications." Id. § 11.9. Similarly, the Patent Trial and Appeals Board can allow a
person who is not a member of the Patent Bar to appear pro hac vice in a proceeding before
the Board. Id. § 41.5.
10. The 70,000 number is based on the sequentially issued bar number that each
member of the Patent Bar receives. These were viewed at List/Roster of Active Patent
Attorneys and Agents with Licenses to Practice Before the USPTO, DATA.GOV,
https://catalog.data.gov/dataset/list-roster-of-active-patent-attorneys-and-agents-with-
licenses-to-practice-before-the-usp (last visited Mar. 24, 2017).
11. Dennis Crouch, Estimate: Fewer than 26,000 Active US Patent Attorneys &
Agents, PATENTLY-O (Jan. 13, 2012), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2012/01/the-uspto-records-
identify-more-than-41750-active-registered-practitioners-that-number-is-obviously-wrong-
because-many-folk.html.
12. Today, about one-fourth of Patent Bar members are patent agents. See
Persons Recognized to Practice in Patent Matters, USPTO, https://oedci.uspto.gov/OEDCI/
(last visited Feb. 21, 2017) (stating that 11,325 of 45,157 practitioners are agents).
13. In addition to being financially attractive, being a member of the Patent Bar
confers other benefits for lawyers. For example, a lawyer who is a member of a state bar is
licensed to practice law only in that state, while a member of the Patent Bar is able to
provide legal services to inventors anywhere in the United States. See Sperry v. Florida, 373
U.S. 379, 384-89, 404 (1963).
14. As noted earlier, the total fees spent by inventors on patent prosecution is
more than $9 billion but there are only 26,000 actively working patent agents and attorneys.
See supra note 7 and accompanying text (estimating the total fees); supra note 10 and
accompanying text (estimating the number of actively working patent agents and attorneys).
Dividing the total fees by the number of active patent practitioners yields an average billing
amount of $346,154. Market surveys confirm this estimate, indicating that even nonattorney
patent agents bill inventors more than $320,000 each year for their services, with patent
attorneys charging even more. AIPLA 2015, supra note 8, at 1-6 ($407,828); AIPLA 2013,
supra note 3, at I-8 ($321,254).
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$126,000 and $175,000, respectively.1 5 In sharp contrast, the median income for
all lawyers is only $115,820.16
One reason for the small size of the Patent Bar might be that the Patent
Bar exam, which is analogous to a state bar exam, screens out many would-be
members. However, it is unlikely that the exam prevents many people from joining
the Patent Bar, particularly lawyers, because the exam tests an applicant's
knowledge of the applicable legal procedures in the USPTO, not technical or
scientific knowledge." Even the procedural matters tested by the exam evidently
do not present substantial hurdles to passage, given that the majority of new
members to the Patent Bar have no legal training whatsoever. Rather, they are
scientists and engineers seeking to become patent agents." Every lawyer has
training in legal procedure, and many have practical experience, making lawyers at
least as capable of passing the procedurally focused Patent Bar exam as engineers
and scientists. Indeed, some lawyers have additional experience or training that
might help them pass, such as familiarity with administrative law and other types
of intellectual property law, like trademark law. Moreover, some lawyers may
have substantial expertise in patent law even though they were not trained as
engineers or scientists because Patent Bar membership is not required to represent
clients in patent lawsuits in federal court.19
But the more likely reason that more lawyers do not join the Patent Bar is
that the USPTO requires that a person have an extensive educational background
in science or engineering to take the Patent Bar exam.20 The prerequisite technical
15. Emily Jane Fox, 100 Best Jobs in America: Patent Agent, CNN MONEY (Feb.
16, 2015, 4:08 PM), http://money.cnn.com/gallery/pf20l5/01/27/best-jobs-2015/4.html;
100 Best Jobs in America: Patent Attorney, CNN MONEY (Nov. 12, 2012),
http://money.cnn.com/pfbest-jobs/2013/snapshots/49.html?iid=BestJobs fl list. Other
sources report even higher salary figures. See, e.g., AIPLA 2015, supra note 8, at 1-4
(reporting that patent agents receive an average of $151,393 in salaries and bonuses).
16. Lawyers, BUREAU LABOR STAT. OCCUPATIONAL OUTLOOK HANDBOOK (Dec.
17, 2015), http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab-1. The average starting salary for
new attorneys working in private practice is less than $85,000. NAT'L Ass'N FOR LAW
PLACEMENT, CLASS OF 2015 NATIONAL SUMMARY REPORT (2016),
http://www.nalp.org/uploads/NatlSummaryClassof20l5.pdf. In fact, for many recent
graduates, even lower paying jobs are hard to find. Dimitra Kessenides, Jobs Are Still
Scarce for New Law School Grads, BLOOMBERG (June 20, 2014, 5:44 AM),
http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-06-20/the-employment-rate-falls-again-for-
recent-law-school-graduates.
17. Christi Guerrini, The Decline of the Patent Registration Exam, 91 NEB. L.
REv. 325, 348-49, 385 (2012).
18. Dennis Crouch, Attorney v. Agent, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 24, 2010),
http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/attorney-versus-agent.html; see infra Section L.A
(discussing the USPTO's eligibility criteria for a person to take the patent bar exam).
19. Moreover, numerous private companies provide courses for preparing to take
the Patent Bar exam. See, e.g., PATBAR, http://patbar.com/ (last visited Feb. 18, 2017);
PLI's Patent Office Exam Course, PRACTICING L. INST., http://www.pli.edu/
patentofficeexamcourse/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
20. OFFICE OF ENROLLMENT & DISCIPLINE, USPTO, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
BULLETIN FOR ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE IN PATENT
CASES BEFORE THE UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE 4-9 (2015) [hereinafter
388 [VOL. 59:383
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background is highly specific, requiring either an undergraduate degree in
engineering or natural sciences, or completion of a substantial number of credits in
engineering or hard-science courses, like physics and chemistry.2 1 Few lawyers
graduating from law school today possess these educational credentials.22
The USPTO's power to preclude attorneys from representing clients on
patent matters is also unique among federal administrative agencies. For all other
agencies, lawyers are presumptively qualified to represent clients even though
some federal agencies deal with exceedingly arcane technology, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency's work related to pollutants.2 3 On issues of
trademark law, the USPTO likewise adheres to this nearly universal approach,
allowing "any individual who is an attorney . . . [to] represent others before the
Office in trademark and other non-patent matters. "24 Only in the USPTO, and only
on patent matters, are attorneys required to possess additional educational
credentials to represent clients .25
Although the technical-education requirement is unique among federal
agencies, and even though the Patent Bar is surprisingly small given the enviable
market position that Patent Bar members enjoy, the USPTO has provided little
justification for the requirement. For example, it has never been the subject of
GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN], http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/
OEDGRB.pdf.
21. Id.
22. See infra Section II.E (describing the slow growth in the Patent Bar in recent
years).
23. Under the APA, "[a]n individual who is a member in good standing of the
bar of the highest court of a State may represent a person before an agency .... " 5 U.S.C.
§ 500(b) (2012). The EPA administers technologically complex regulations, including
requiring sulfur emissions' calculations in eight-hour intervals using the following equation:
Sf Q
i=1
The regulation defines the variables in this equation as follows:
Sr = fresh feed sulfur content expressed in percent by weight of fresh
feed.
n = number of separate fresh feed streams charged directly to the riser or
reactor of the fluid catalytic cracking unit.
Qr= total volumetric flow rate of fresh feed charged to the fluid catalytic
cracking unit.
Si = fresh feed sulfur content expressed in percent by weight of fresh
feed for the "ith" sampling location.
Qi = volumetric flow rate of fresh feed stream for the "ith" sampling
location.
40 C.F.R. § 60.106 (2016).
24. 37 C.F.R. § 11.14 (2016).
25. 5 U.S.C. § 500(e); 37 C.F.R. §11.14.
2017] 389
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notice-and-comment procedures under the Administrative Procedure Act
("APA"). 26 From time to time, the USPTO summarily asserts that the technical-
education requirement protects the public from "unqualified practitioners," but the
USPTO has not explained why the invisible hand of the market cannot match
inventors with qualified patent practitioners. Legal scholars, likewise, have not
analyzed the tradeoffs inherent in the technical-education requirement, in marked
contrast to the wealth of scholarship analyzing the costs stemming from patent
litigation and from invalid patents.27 This paucity of analysis is particularly
striking given that "among technology startups, the cost of getting a patent is the
most common reason cited for not patenting a major technology."28 In contrast,
occupational-licensing regimes have been closely analyzed in other areas of law by
scholars and lawmakers alike, including the U.S. Supreme Court.29
This Article therefore seeks to fill this void in the scholarly literature by
analyzing the economic consequences of the Patent Bar's technical-education
requirement. Presumably, the USPTO would assert that licensing is needed to
guarantee that all patent attorneys and agents possess some minimum level
technical sophistication. However, economists have long recognized that an
inevitable side effect of occupational licensing is to erect barriers to entry that limit
supply in labor markets, which in turn increases the prices borne by consumers.30
26. See infra Section II.B (discussing the applicability of the APA to the
technical-education requirement).
27. A small group of scholars have examined particular aspects of the structure
of the Patent Bar. See Michelle J. Burke & Thomas G. Field, Promulgating Requirements
for Admission to Prosecute Patent Applications, 36 IDEA 145, 150-56 (1995) (asserting
that the technical-education requirement violates the APA, particularly as applied to
computer science majors); Ralph D. Clifford et al., A Statistical Analysis of the Patent Bar:
Where Are the Software-Savvy Patent Attorneys?, 11 N.C. J. L. & TECH. 223 passim (2010)
(empirically studying the technical backgrounds of members of the Patent Bar to argue that
"too few attorneys and agents have relevant experience in the most often patented areas
today, such as computer science"); Nicholas Matich, Patent Office Practice After the
America Invents Act, 23 FED. CIR. BAR J. 225 passim (2013) (arguing that the technical-
education requirement violates the APA); Kenneth L. Port et al., Where Have All the Patent
Lawyers Gone? Long Time Passing... , 97 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 193, 199-
203 (2015) (analyzing the percentage of members of the Patent Bar who are women); Corey
B. Blake, Note, Ghosts of the Past: Does the USPTO's Scientific and Technical Background
Requirement Still Make Sense?, 82 TEX. L. REv. 735 passim (2004) (arguing that the
technical-education requirement should be expanded to allow persons with degrees in
design and business because inventions in those areas are ligible for patent protection). See
generally Guerrini, supra note 17 (tracing the history of the Patent Bar exam and proposing
improvements).
28. Stuart J.H. Graham et al., High Technology Entrepreneurs and the Patent
System: Results of the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1256, 1310
(2010).
29. See, e.g., N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1115-
16 (2015); Aaron Edlin & Rebecca Haw, Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed
Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny, 162 U. PA. L. REv. 1093, 1098-99 (2014) (listing
critiques of occupational licensing in the popular media and among politicians).
30. Morris M. Kleiner, Occupational Licensing, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 189, 192,
197 (2000); Thomas G. Moore, The Purpose of Licensing, 4 J.L. & ECON. 93, 104 (1961);
390
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Unfortunately, some consumers will not be able to afford these higher prices, and
the exclusion of these consumers from the market reduces social welfare.
However, in some contexts occupational licensing is nevertheless justified because
it cures various market defects, thereby generating sufficient economic benefits to
offset the inevitable harms.32 This Article examines whether these economic
rationales can be applied to the Patent Bar, and concludes that, at least as applied
to lawyers, the technical-education requirement is not-and likely cannot be-
supported and should thus be reformed.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I begins by identifying the costs
and benefits of occupational licensing generally recognized by economists.
Because the USPTO has not provided a sufficient economic justification for the
technical-education requirement, Part I also attempts to build, from the economic
literature, the strongest plausible justification for the requirement. Part II, however,
demonstrates the inevitable inadequacies of any such justification in light of
modem legal and technical realities. Accordingly, Part III proposes an
economically efficient expansion to the Patent Bar: eliminating the technical-
education requirement for lawyers. In developing a roadmap to implement these
reforms, Part III reviews previous failed attempts to expand the Patent Bar and
analyzes the USPTO's economic incentives to maintain an inefficiently small Bar.
Finally, this Article briefly concludes with a short summary of the arguments
presented in the Article.
I. SIMPLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PATENT BAR
A. Current Requirements for Patent Bar Membership
The Patent Act grants the USPTO the power to regulate "the recognition
and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other
parties before the Office" and to require that they possess "the necessary
qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and
assistance." Pursuant to this power, the USPTO created formal regulations
requiring that applicants to the Patent Bar possess "legal, scientific, and technical
Carl Shapiro, Investment, Moral Hazard, and Occupational Licensing, 53 REv. EcON. STUD.
843, 844 (1986). See generally Hayne E. Leland, Quacks, Lemons, and Licensing: A Theory
ofMinimum Quality Standards, 87 J. POL. ECON. 1328 (1979).
31. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1114-16; Kleiner, supra note 30, at 197;
Moore, supra note 30, at 104; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 850; see also ROGER S. FRANTZ, X-
EFFICIENCY: THEORY, EVIDENCE, AND APPLICATIONs 21 (1988) (discussing deadweight loss);
Yoram Barzel, Measurement Costs and the Organization of Markets, J.L. & EcON. 27, 29
(1982) (noting that buyers may be averse to variability in purchased goods and services); cf
GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 178 (6th ed. 2012) (discussing
deadweight loss in the context of tariffs).
32. See Kleiner, supra note 30, at 191-92; Leland, supra note 30, at 1329;
Moore, supra note 30, at 103; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 844; see also Wendy J. Gordon,
Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and
Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1600, 1607-08 (1982) (summarizing theory that
markets promote economic efficiency absent some market failures, in which case
government regulation may increase welfare more than an unregulated market).
33. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2012).
2017] 391
ARIZONA LAW REVIEW [VOL. 59:383
qualifications."34 The USPTO has not, however, promulgated further regulations
elaborating upon the required qualifications. Instead, the USPTO clarified the
requirements through an ostensibly nonbinding publication generally referred to as
the "General Requirements Bulletin" ("the Bulletin"), which describes three
categories (A, B, and C) for demonstrating that an applicant possesses the requisite
scientific and technical training.
Under "Category A," applicants that possess bachelor's degrees in 1 of 32
enumerated science and engineering disciplines, such as physics or electrical
engineering, automatically satisfy the requirement for a technical education.36
Category A includes computer science as an acceptable degree, but only from
specially accredited programs.37 Some degrees, however, are explicitly excluded
from Category A, including biological sciences, pharmacy, and mechanical
technology.38 Moreover, only a bachelor's degree is acceptable under Category A;
a doctorate or other advanced degree does not qualify.39
Under "Category B," applicants can demonstrate that, while lacking
undergraduate degrees listed in Category A, they nevertheless have taken a
sufficient number of credits to form the "equivalent" of a Category A degree.40
The USPTO defines this "equivalence" in detail, specifying the number of credit
hours that an applicant must take in different disciplines to qualify under Category
B. For instance, an applicant can satisfy Category B's requirements by taking "24
34. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(ii) (2016).
35. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4-8. Whether the
Bulletin should be treated as a regulation is discussed below in Sections III.B and III.D. The
USPTO purports to retain the discretion in appropriate circumstances to allow an applicant
to take the Patent Bar even if he or she lacks the qualifications of Categories A, B, or C,
though the USPTO has not identified any cases in which that discretion has actually been
exercised. See Premysler v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 387, 389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
36. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4. The degrees are
Biochemistry, Biology, Botany, Computer Science, Electronics Technology, Engineering
Physics, Food Technology, General Chemistry, Marine Technology, Microbiology,
Molecular Biology, Organic Chemistry, Pharmacology, Physics, Textile Technology,
Aeronautical Engineering, Agricultural Engineering, Biomedical Engineering, Ceramic
Engineering, Chemical Engineering, Civil Engineering, Computer Engineering, Electrical
Engineering, Electrochemical Engineering, General Engineering, Geological Engineering,
Industrial Engineering, Mechanical Engineering, Metallurgical Engineering, Mining
Engineering, Nuclear Engineering, and Petroleum Engineering. Id. at 4.
37. Computer science degrees are only accepted under Category A if they were
issued from a school that was "accredited by the Computer Science Accreditation
Commission ('CSAC') of the Computing Sciences Accreditation Board ('CSAB'), or by the
Computing Accreditation Commission ('CAC') of the Accreditation Board for Engineering
and Technology ('ABET')" at the time that the degree was issued. Id.; see, e.g., USPTO,
DECISION ON PETITION FOR REVIEw 9-11, (Nov. 12, 1997), http://e-
foia.uspto.gov/Foia/RetrievePdf?system=OED&flNm=0115_TEC_1997-11-12 (refusing to
allow an applicant to take the Patent Bar exam in part because the applicant's computer
science degree issued from an institution that was not appropriately accredited).
38. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4-5.
39. Id. at 4.
40. Id. at 4-5.
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semester hours in physics" or "30 semester hours in chemistry."41 Hybrid exposure
to multiple technological fields can also satisfy Category B, though doing so
requires a larger number of total credit hours. For example, an applicant can satisfy
Category B's standards by demonstrating that she has taken 40 semester hours in a
combination consisting of (i) eight semester hours of chemistry or eight semester
hours of physics, and (ii) 32 semester hours of chemistry, physics, biology, botany,
microbiology, molecular biology, or engineering.42 Certain coursework, however,
is per se unacceptable under any variation described in Category B, including
mathematics courses and patent law courses.43
Finally, under "Category C" an applicant can demonstrate sufficient
technical credentials by passing a comprehensive engineering exam called the
"Fundamentals of Engineering" test." The National Council of Examiners for
Engineering and Surveying develops this exam, and various state boards of
engineering in each state use it for licensing purposes.45 The exam is offered in
seven engineering disciplines, uch as "chemical" and "electrical and computer."46
B. Economic Effects of Occupational Licensing
Many professions are subject to licensing requirements. By one estimate,
20% of workers in the United States operate in professions subject to licensing,
which is a larger portion of the labor economy than that affected by the minimum
wage or unions.47 As a result of the prominence of occupational licensing,
economists have analyzed the asserted justifications and effects of licensing.48 One
commonly recognized explanation is that practitioners in regulated professions
agitate for occupational licensing to reduce competition and raise their own
41. Id.
42. Id. Some other coursework may be accepted under this section, including up
to four semester hours in design engineering and drafting. Id. at 6.
43. Id. at 7. The USPTO further states that other factors may be considered "on a
case-by-case basis with respect to scientific and technical training" and that the USPTO
may consider other education, including "foreign education, academic credit for work
experience, military education, life experiences, etc." Id. at 7. In marked contrast,
mathematics degrees qualify a person to take the qualifying examination to be a member of
the European Patent Bar. EUROPEAN PATENT OFFICE, REGULATION ON THE EUROPEAN
QUALIFYING EXAMINATION FOR PROFESSIONAL REPRESENTATIVES 24 (2014),
http://www.epo.org/law-practice/legal-texts/official-journal/2014/etc/se2/2014-se2.pdf.
44. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 8.
45. FE Exam, NCEES, http://ncees.org/exams/fe-exam/ (last visited Feb. 28,
2017).
46. Id. The other disciplines are "civil," "environmental," "industrial,"
"mechanical," and "other disciplines." Id.
47. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, The Prevalence and Effects of
Occupational Licensing, 2010 BRITISH J. INDUS. REL. 1, 3; Kleiner, supra note 30, at 190.
Over 800 occupations now require some form of licensing. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at
1102.
48. Kleiner, supra note 30, at 189 ("The study of the regulation of occupations
has a long and distinguished tradition in economics.").
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profits.49 While this view of licensing regimes may be descriptively accurate, it
lacks normative support. Economists, therefore, have worked to assess whether
and in what contexts licensing can increase conomic efficiency, concluding that
in three situations occupational licensing can improve service quality and thereby
cure market defects.
First, occupational licensing may alleviate informational problems that
sometimes arise in the purchase of services.0 While service providers have
information about the quality of services that they offer, consumers often cannot
obtain this information before making purchasing decisions, in part because, unlike
with physical goods, a buyer cannot inspect services before they are purchased.
Even after services have been rendered, consumers may lack the expertise needed
to assess their quality.5 2 For example, after receiving treatment, patients untrained
in medicine may have difficulty evaluating whether their doctors were effective or
were "quacks.""
When consumers are unsure about service quality, affected markets
function poorly. Consumers in need of high-quality services may be unable to
confidently identify the appropriate suppliers, and this uncertainty may deter those
customers from paying the higher prices necessary to support high-quality
services. Customers fearful of "lemons" may be dissuaded from participating in
the market altogether.54 Consumers' reluctance to pay higher prices may prevent
service providers from making the necessary investments to improve or even
maintain the quality of their services.
Occupational licensing can reduce informational asymmetries by cheaply
demonstrating to consumers that members of a profession possess certain
49. See Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1103-04 (noting that licensing boards
with financial interests in limiting competition "often succumb to the temptation of self-
dealing, [by] creating regulations to insulate incumbents rather than . . . ensure public
welfare"); Moore, supra note 30, at 110. See generally N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners
v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (noting that market participants may support egulation due
to "private anticompetitive motives").
50. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1115-16; Leland, supra note 30, at 1329;
Moore, supra note 30, at 104; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 850.
51. Leland, supra note 30, at 1329; Moore, supra note 30, at 104; Shapiro, supra
note 30, at 845. In this respect, informational asymmetries are less likely to occur with
physical goods because a prospective buyer can often examine the qualities of a product
before agreeing to buy. Shapiro, supra note 30, at 845. With some goods, however, a buyer
cannot observe important qualities, like the safety of a commercial jet. See Leland, supra
note 30, at 1339-40.
52. Leland, supra note 30, at 1329; Moore, supra note 30, at 105; Shapiro, supra
note 30, at 845.
53. Leland, supra note 30, at 1329; Moore, supra note 30, at 105. Medical
malpractice suits do not solve this informational asymmetry, as such claims can be difficult
to prove and provide only a minimum floor for competence. See Leland, supra note 30, at
1330; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 845. Other mechanisms might also reduce informational
asymmetries, like "repeat purchases, product labeling, and other forms of product
information," but some markets are poorly suited to these types of informational tools. See
Leland, supra note 30, at 1330.
54. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1115-16.
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qualifications. For example, lawyers must demonstrate basic legal competency by
passing bar exams in order to practice law." By eliminating service providers
without the required credentials, the average quality of services available in the
market improves, at least insofar as licensing requirements correlate with service
quality. As a result, consumers may be willing to pay more for higher-quality
services.56 Similarly, service providers may be more likely to invest in improving
service quality armed with greater confidence that those investments will increase
revenue.5 7
A second justification for occupational licensing is that, in some
circumstances, it protects customers from making decisions that are not in their
own best interests.58 For example, cognitive biases or bounded rationality may
cause some customers to underestimate the risks involved with using low-quality
service providers. To illustrate, consider a consumer who hires a handyman to
perform electrical work because cognitive biases cause the consumer to
underestimate the likelihood that shoddy work will produce an electrical fire. 59 The
licensing of electricians in such a situation paternalistically protects individuals
from their own shortsighted decisions.60 When occupational licensing effectively
protects consumers from their own costly mistakes, social welfare increases.
A third justification for occupational licensing is that buyers who use
low-quality services may externalize costs to third parties.61 This situation arises,
55. Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers and Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing,
69 Mo. L. REv. 299, 303 (2004). Some have argued, however, that the bar exam "provides
little assurance of attorney competence." Id. at 309. Moreover, some commentators assert
that lawyers have "yielded to the temptation of self-dealing" to the detriment of consumers.
Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1108.
56. Kleiner, supra note 30, at 192, 198 (noting that improved quality of services
may increase demand).
57. Id. at 191 ("Occupational licensure creates a greater incentive for individuals
to invest in more occupation-specific human capital because they will be more able to
recoup the full returns to their investment if they need not face low-quality substitutes for
their services.").
58. Moore, supra note 30, at 106-09.
59. See id. at 106 (discussing how licensing exists to protect overly optimistic
consumers); see also RICHARD H. THALER & CASs R. SUNSTEFN, NUDGE: IMPROVING
DECISIONs ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINEss 31-33 (2008) (describing the
"optimism bias," under which individuals are "unrealistically optimistic"); William
Hubbard, The Debilitating Effect of Exclusive Rights: Patents and Productive Inefficiency,
66 FLA. L. REv. 2045, 2059-65 (2014) (discussing various reasons that individuals will not
maximize their own welfare).
60. Economists contend that paternalistic occupational licensing is particularly
beneficial to consumers where: (1) there is substantial variance in service quality; (2) the
costs of insufficient services are substantial; (3) substantial training is necessary to assess
service quality; and (4) consumers use the service infrequently. Moore, supra note 30, at
106. Of course, licensing criteria must correlate strongly with improved quality in order to
benefit consumers, which is unlikely if lawmakers are as rationally impaired as consumers.
See id. at 109-10; infra Section II.C (explaining the reluctance of the USPTO to reform the
structure of the Patent Bar).
61. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1116-17; Kleiner, supra note 30, at 192;
Moore, supra note 30, at 109-10.
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for example, when a low-quality doctor misdiagnoses a disease, thereby allowing
an individual infection to grow into an epidemic.62 Occupational licensing would
prevent the patient from relying on an incompetent doctor, thus preventing the
outbreak. However, licensing would also raise the costs of medical services, so
that the sick patient might not be able to afford any medical treatment at all, in
which case the patient's illness also sparks an epidemic.63 This justification for
licensing thus applies only in limited contexts, such as when there are non-market
alternatives to low-quality services (such as state-sponsored medical services) or
when using low-quality services is worse than not using any service at all.'
While occupational licensing may produce benefits, it simultaneously
raises costs and therefore reduces social welfare. To join an occupation that is
subject to licensing, a person must invest additional resources to obtain the
required credentials. In some cases, a portion of suppliers will not make this
investment. As a result, the labor supply shrinks compared to an unregulated
market, and prices rise.65 Even if all suppliers invest in satisfying licensing criteria,
prices will rise to reflect the additional cost of production. In either case,
occupational licensing produces higher prices for consumers, with leading labor
economists estimating that occupational licensing generates price increases of 10
to 15% .66 Particularly cost-sensitive consumers will be unable to afford the
licensed services, producing deadweight losses that reduce consumer welfare.67
Balancing costs and benefits is thus crucial in evaluating whether an
occupational licensing scheme promotes economic efficiency.68 Unfortunately, as
with many issues of economic efficiency, these costs and benefits cannot be
measured empirically, which prevents a precise calibration in close cases.69 Three
62. Kleiner, supra note 30, at 192; Moore, supra note 30, at 110.
63. See infra notes 64-66 and accompanying text (describing the costs inherent
in occupational licensing).
64. Moore, supra note 30, at 110. Legal services might present an instance when
an individual's use of low-quality services is worse for society than the individual
proceeding without assistance. For example, a well-informed, rational client might use an
unlicensed, low-quality lawyer to initiate spurious lawsuits to obtain nuisance settlements.
Society may be better off if the client cannot obtain this low-quality representation.
65. Kleiner, supra note 30, at 192; Moore, supra note 30, at 104. Reduced
competition may lead to service providers delivering lower-quality services. See Hubbard,
supra note 59, at 2067-70.
66. Morris M. Kleiner & Alan B. Krueger, Analyzing the Extent and Influence of
Occupational Licensing in the Labor Market, 31 J. LAB. EcON. S 173, S179 (2013); see also
Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1113 (finding 10-12% price increase).
67. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1114-15; Kleiner, supra note 30, at 197;
Moore, supra note 30, at 104; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 850; see also FRANTZ, supra note
31, at 20-21 (discussing deadweight loss); GREGORY MANKw, PRINCIPLES OF
MICROECONOMICS 178 (6th ed. 2012) (same); Barzel, supra note 31, at 29 (noting that
buyers are averse to variability in purchased goods and services).
68. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1111-12; Kleiner, supra note 30, at 198
(discussing the balancing of costs and benefits related to occupational licensing); Shapiro,
supra note 30, at 844, 856 (same).
69. See, e.g., WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC
STRUCTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAw 9 (2003); Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1934;
Peter Lee, Toward a Distributive Commons in Patent Law, 2009 Wis. L. REv. 917, 931
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general strategies are therefore useful in evaluating whether occupational licensing
promotes economic efficiency.
First, occupational licensing schemes should be disfavored when the
presence of market failures is unclear because licensing always produces costs in
the form of higher prices but only sometimes produces benefits by curing market
defects.70 Importantly, many service markets operate effectively without licensing.
For example, informational asymmetries have little effect in some markets because
the presence or absence of key credentials is easy to assess even without licensing.
Similarly, information about service quality may be provided through other means,
such as reputational mechanisms.
Second, occupational licensing should be disfavored when licensing
requirements poorly correlate with the service quality desired by many
consumers.71 For instance, requiring lawyers to speak Spanish before being
admitted to the bar is unlikely to promote economic efficiency because many
clients do not need their lawyers to speak Spanish.72 Licensing is also less likely to
promote efficiency when substantial numbers of consumers do not value higher-
quality services, as such licensing schemes simply limit the market for services to
"over trained" and more expensive professionals.7 ' For instance, if a state were to
require bar applicants to obtain both JD and LLM degrees, many consumers might
object because the additional legal training may not be necessary in many contexts.
Finally, occupational licensing should be disfavored when there are less
costly alternatives that achieve the same results. Informational problems, for
example, can also be addressed through certification schemes, whereby service
providers who meet certain requirements receive a special designation. Unlike
(asserting that "the patent system does not engage, nor is it equipped to engage, in
macroscopic cost-benefit analyses to determine the ideal scope of particular exclusive
rights"): Margaret Jane Radin, Regulation by Contract, Regulation by Machine, 160 J.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL EcON. 1, 7 (2004) ("How much propertization is too much?
That is an empirical question to which no one knows the answer.").
70. The only occupational-licensing schemes that do not either reduce supply or
raise the costs of production in a labor market are schemes that have no impact on service
providers. Such licensing regimes therefore cannot cure any market defects and do not
promote economic efficiency.
71. Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1011-12 (noting that occupational licensing
"can only be justified where it leads to better quality professional services").
72. The economic effects of a requirement that lawyers perform pro bono work
are less clear. See, e.g., Anne Barnard, Top Judge Makes Free Legal Work Mandatory for
Joining State Bar, N.Y. TIMES (May 1, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/05/02/nyregion/new-lawyers-in-new-york-to-be-required-to-do-some-work-
free.html?_r-0 (noting that New York requires bar applicants to perform 50 hours of pro
bono work). In some instances, work performed for pro bono clients will be dissimilar from
a lawyer's later practice. This situation may arise with patent litigators, for example. For
other lawyers, pro bono legal work may provide valuable transferrable experience. The
economic analysis is further complicated by indirect effects of a pro bono requirement. For
instance, pro bono work may improve the reputations of lawyers generally, and providing
greater access to legal processes may have broad-ranging economic benefits for society.
73. See Shapiro, supra note 30, at 847 (noting that "[t]he heterogeneity of
consumers in their valuation of quality is critical to a proper analysis of licensing").
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licensing, uncertified service providers can still participate in the market.74
Certification can be done by a government entity or private industry, as in the case
of the Better Business Bureau." Because certification can address informational
asymmetries without eliminating low-end, bargain services from the market, it
often will be a less costly alternative to occupational icensing.7 6
C Simple Patent Bar Economics
It does not appear that the USPTO has ever articulated a detailed
economic justification for the technical-education requirement." For example, as
described in more detail below, the General Requirements Bulletin and its
precursors have never been subjected to the notice-and-comment procedures
required by other federal regulations. At best, the statutes and regulation
underlying the Bulletin indicate, in a broad sense, that the requirement is intended
to help parties seeking patent representation i  the USPTO, that is, inventors and
persons challenging the validity of issued patents. The Patent Act grants the
USPTO the power to regulate patent agents and attorneys to ensure that patent
practitioners possess "the necessary qualifications to render . . . valuable service,
advice, and assistance" in the USPTO.7 9 Likewise, USPTO regulations require
that a patent practitioner "possess[] the legal, scientific, and technical
qualifications necessary for him or her to render applicants valuable service."80
This account of the technical-education requirement is at least consistent
with the first justification for occupational licensing discussed in the previous
section: reducing informational asymmetries. Patent matters are both legally and
factually complex, and it may be difficult for inventors to evaluate the abilities of a
patent practitioner when selecting representation. The goal of helping inventors
and others obtain valuable services in the USPTO also aligns with the second
74. Moore, supra note 30, at 104; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 853.
75. Get Accredited, BBB, http://www.bbb.org/council/for-businesses/about-bbb-
accreditation (last visited Mar. 2, 2017).
76. Moore, supra note 30, at 104; Shapiro, supra note 30, at 853.
77. Indeed, it is difficult to determine when or why the USPTO created the
technical-education requirement. It appears that the requirement was created between 1908,
when the USPTO first began requiring that nonlawyers possess "legal and technical
qualifications," and 1963, when a court discussed the technical-education requirement in the
Bulletin in a reported decision. Compare U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE
UNITED STATES PATENT OFFICE, supp. Rule 17 (1908), with Gager v. Ladd, 212 F. Supp.
671 (D.D.C. 1963). The author of this Article consequently submitted a request to the
USPTO for documents dated between 1908 and 1963 regarding the establishment of the
technical-education requirement and the General Requirements Bulletin. Letter from Ricou
Heaton, USPTO FOIA Officer, to William Hubbard, Assoc. Professor, Univ. of Balt. Sch.
of Law (Nov. 4, 2015) (on file with the author). Although the USPTO produced 111 pages
of documents in response to this request, it did not disclose any documents describing the
establishment of the technical-education requirement. See also infra Section II.A
(discussing the historical origin of the Patent Bar).
78. See infra Section II.B (discussing the applicability of the APA to the
technical-education requirement).
79. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2012) (emphasis added).
80. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(2)(ii) (2016) (emphasis added).
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justification for occupational licensing, paternalistically protecting consumers who
are unable to rationally evaluate the capabilities of patent practitioners. As noted
above, such paternalism is more likely to be justified when substantial training is
necessary to assess service quality and consumers use the service infrequently.8 1
Because patent matters are both legally and technically complex, some inventors
may face great difficulties in assessing service quality, particularly those inventors
who obtain few patents. If inventors could cut comers by hiring cheaper, less
sophisticated representation in the USPTO, they might ultimately fail to obtain
valuable patents. The technical-education requirement, in theory, could prevent
some inventors from being penny wise and pound foolish.
It is more difficult to justify the technical-education requirement under
the third justification for occupational licensing, protecting third parties. Certainly,
patents often affect third parties. Every year, the USPTO improperly issues
thousands of invalid patents, and low-quality practitioners might generate low-
quality patents that are particularly harmful to others. For instance, with some
frequency, invalid patents are asserted against defendants in district court
litigation, in part because invalidity defenses must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence.82 Even if an accused infringer ultimately succeeds in
demonstrating that the patent is invalid, doing so requires the expenditure of
substantial resources.
Although low-quality patents likely affect third parties, the USPTO
probably could not justify the technical-education requirement by pointing to third-
party effects. Most importantly, the third-party justification for occupational
licensing cannot be squared with the explicit statutory and regulatory goals of
helping inventors and others obtain "valuable services" in the USPTO.83
Moreover, the use of higher-quality representation i  the USPTO may exacerbate
harmful third-party effects rather than ameliorate them. For instance, the use of
higher-quality patent practitioners may lead to the USPTO issuing more invalid
patents. When an inventor files a patent application, an examiner must grant the
application unless the examiner can demonstrate that a patent should not issue.84
However, overworked examiners have relatively little time to make their case
against issuance. On average, examiners spend about 18 hours working on each
patent application.8 5 In contrast, patent practitioners will work for as long as
81. Moore, supra note 30, at 106.
82. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 561 U.S. 94, 95 (2011); Robert P. Merges,
As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before Breakfast: Property Rights for Business
Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 577, 592 (1999); Steven
Yelderman, Improving Patent Quality with Applicant Incentives, 28 HARv. J.L. & TECH. 77,
83 (2014); see also Shubha Ghosh & Jay Kesan, What Do Patents Purchase? In Search of
Optimal Ignorance in the Patent Office, 40 Hous. L. REv. 1219, 1228 (2004); Christopher
R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Patents, 91 MINN. L. REv. 101,
113-39 (2006).
83. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D).
84. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the patent
examiner bears the burden of demonstrating that a patent application should not issue).
85. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, The Growing Complexity of the United
States Patent System, 82 B.U. L. REv. 77, 135 (2002).
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inventors continue to pay. The result is that inventors and their patent practitioners
can succeed in the USPTO by wearing down patent examiners. As Judge Learned
Hand observed almost a century ago: "[T]he antlike persistency of [patent]
solicitors has overcome, and I suppose, will continue to overcome, the patience of
examiners ... ."86 More adept patent practitioners could exacerbate this problem.
II. A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY VIEW OF THE PATENT BAR
The brief account in Part I might be the start of an economic justification
for the technical-education requirement. The requirement might reduce
informational asymmetries or paternalistically protect inventors from their own
flawed decision-making. This Part demonstrates, however, that closer scrutiny
reveals that the previous analysis is fatally incomplete, particularly in light of
changes in patent law in recent years.
A. Invented Benefits of the Patent Bar
One reason to doubt that the technical-education requirement provides
significant benefits to society is that market failures regarding technical
qualifications did not play a role in the Patent Bar's legal origins.87 The roots of
the Patent Bar stretch to the mid-nineteenth century, when practice before the
USPTO was largely unregulated. By the 1860s, lawmakers began raising
concerns that a lack of regulation had allowed unscrupulous patent agents to take
advantage of unsuspecting inventors. These agents allegedly would help inventors
obtain patents that were drafted with quick issuance in mind rather than effective
protection for inventions.89 For example, in 1859 the Commissioner of Patents
asserted that "the present law affords . . . many facilities for the dishonest practices
of such men, by whom innocent inventors are continually plundered."90 In
response, in 1861, Congress granted the USPTO the power to ban patent
practitioners from representing inventors for "gross misconduct."91 However, this
high standard for misconduct produced only limited restrictions on patent agents
and attorneys.92 Allegations of abuses continued, including concerns regarding
86. Lyon v. Boh, 1 F.2d 48, 50 (S.D.N.Y. 1924), rev'd, 10 F.2d 30 (2d Cir.
1926).
87. See Shapiro, supra note 30, at 851 ("Licensing is of little benefit ... when
there is little reputation problem."); see also supra note 70 and accompanying text (arguing
that occupational licensing should be disfavored when market failures are not clearly
present).
88. Prior to 1861, both lawyers and nonlawyers could assist inventors in the
USPTO. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 388-89 (1963).
89. Kara W. Swanson, The Emergence of the Professional Patent Practitioner,
50 TECH. & CULTURE 519, 530 (2009).
90. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, 36TH CONG., ANNUAL REPORT OF THE COMMISSIONER OF
PATENTS FOR THE YEAR 1859, at 6 (1860).
91. Act of March 2, 1861, ch. 88, 12 Stat. 246. At this time, the USPTO was
known simply as the "Patent Office," as trademark aspects of the USPTO were not added
until 1881. Act of March 3, 1881, ch. 138, 21 Stat. 502. For simplicity, this Article ignores
the distinction between the USPTO and the Patent Office.
92. Swanson, supra note 89, at 530. In one of the few cases where a practitioner
was banned from representing clients in the USPTO, gross misconduct was not based on
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deceptive advertising practices by nonlawyer patent agents who were "not subject
to the professional restraints of their lawyer brethren."93
As a result, in 1897, the USPTO began requiring that patent agents and
attorneys register in order to be "entitled to represent applicants before the
[USPTO] in the presentation and prosecution of applications for patents."94 Under
this precursor to the modern Patent Bar, an attorney was automatically eligible to
register with the USPTO regardless of his technical credentials so long as he was
"in good standing in any court of record in the United States."95 In contrast,
nonlawyers were only admitted provided they "possessed the necessary
qualifications to enable [them] to render applicants for patents valuable service."96
In 1908, the USPTO further clarified that nonlawyers must possess "legal and
technical qualifications."97
At this time, the USPTO's registration requirement lacked statutory
support. In 1922, Congress corrected this deficiency by enacting § 487 of the
Patent Act, which stated that the Commissioner of Patents may require that patent
agents and attorneys possess "the necessary qualifications to enable them to render
applicants or other persons valuable service, and are likewise competent to advise
and assist applicants and other persons in the presentation or prosecution of their
applications or other business before the office."98 The same year, the USPTO
began requiring that every applicant to the Patent Bar "file proof that he is
possessed of . . . legal and technical qualifications."99 This change, however,
technical incompetence, but legal misconduct, namely convincing 33,000 inventors to pay
for unnecessary legal services. Deborah J. Merritt, Hypatia in the Patent Office: Women
Inventors and the Law, 1865-1900, 35 Am. J. LEGAL HIsT. 235, 299 (1991).
93. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 390 (1963).
94. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF THE U.S. PATENT OFFICE 971, r.
17 (Aug. 17, 1897), https://books.google.com/books?id=NGAbAQAAMAAJ&pg=
PAl 126&dq-patent+office+%22rules+of+practice%22+1897&hl-en&sa=X&ved=0ahUK
Ewi28sDW3pfSAhXBMyYKHRNiAFIQ6AEILDAD#v-onepage&q=rule%2017&f=false.
95. Id. at r. 17(b).
96. Id. at r. 17(d).
97. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, RULES OF PRACTICE IN THE UNITED STATES PATENT




98. Act of February 18, 1922, ch. 58, § 3, 42 Stat. 390; see also Act of July 8,
1870, ch. 230, § 19, 16 Stat. 200; Act of July 4, 1884, ch. 181, § 5, 23 Stat. 101. Although
the statutory provision regarding the credentials of patent agents and attorneys was
recodified and amended in minor respects over the years, the modem version of the statute
is largely unchanged, granting the USPTO the power to require practitioners to possess "the
necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice,
and assistance." Section 487 was recodified in 1952 as 35 U.S.C. § 31, which in turn was
reenacted as 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) in 1999. Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2000, Pub.
L. No. 106-113, § 4715, 113 Stat 1501.
99. See U.S PATENT OFFICE, 298 OFFICIAL GAZETTE 642-43 (1922),
https://books.google.com/books?id=atBZinlUIE8C&1pg=PA642&ots=VWxHlj55cl&dq-pa
tent%20office%2ORules%2OoPo20Practice%201922&pg=PA642#v=onepage&q-patent%2
Ooffice%2ORules%2OoPo20Practice%201922&f=false. Eventually, the USPTO issued
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erected only a minimal barrier for lawyers to join the Patent Bar, as the USPTO
typically accepted as "proof' affidavits from an applicant's supportive colleagues.
Some commentators criticized this system as being "subject to the great weakness
of friendship," whereby established members of the Patent Bar would submit
affidavits on behalf of an applicant merely because he was "a good fellow." 00
Consequently, in 1934, the USPTO amended its rules to require that
applicants to the Patent Bar pass an entrance examination known today as the
Patent Bar Exam. To be eligible to take the exam, nonlawyers were required to
demonstrate that they possessed egrees in engineering or physical science or an
equivalent thereto.101 Lawyers, however, were automatically eligible to take the
exam.102 As a result, for many years, lawyers without technical degrees joined the
Patent Bar, and by 1960, 22% of Patent Bar members were lawyers without
technical degrees.1 03
Problems of insufficient technical credentials thus appear to have played
little role in the establishment of the technical-education requirement, particularly
as applied to attorneys.1" In the absence of some market failure, occupational
licensing is generally inferior to free-market forces in promoting economic
efficiency. o As a cure in search for a disease, it is less likely that the requirement
provides substantial economic benefits compared to the costs.
regulations requiring that patent practitioners possess " cientific" or "technical" credentials.
37 C.F.R. § 1.17(b) (1938); see also 37 C.F.R. § 1.17(a) (1944) (requiring "legal and
scientific qualifications"); 37 C.F.R. § 1.341(c) (1949) (requiring "legal and scientific and
technical qualifications").
100. Guerrini, supra note 17, at 336 (quoting Memorandum from Thomas E.
Robertson to Dr. Dickinson (Aug. 2, 1933)).
101. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, PATENT OFFICE, GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
ADMISSION TO THE EXAMINATION FOR REGISTRATION TO PRACTICE BEFORE THE PATENT
OFFICE 1 (1960) (on file with the author).
102. Id. Among other topics, the exam tested "an understanding of scientific and
technical terminology." Id. at 2.
103. See PATENT OFFICE ADVISORY COMM., PROPOSAL FOR CONSIDERATION AT
MEETING TO BE HELD SEPTEMBER 15, 1960, at 3 (on file with the author). An examination
conducted on behalf of the Commissioner of the Patent Office revealed that lawyers without
technical degrees failed the Patent Bar Exam at higher rates than lawyers with technical
training, but there is no evidence that the nontechnical lawyers who passed the exam and
were admitted to the Patent Bar provided lower-quality patent services than technical
lawyers who were admitted to the Patent Bar. U.S. PATENT OFFICE, EXAMINATION OF
LAWYERs APPLYING FOR PRACTICE BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE 11-14 (July 9, 1957) (on file
with the author).
104. As described above, the public record does not disclose when or why the
USPTO created the technical-education requirement. See supra note 77 and accompanying
text; see also infra Section III.B (discussing the inapplicability of the APA to the technical-
education requirement). Public sources are further silent regarding the USPTO's decision to
begin applying the technical-education requirement to lawyers sometime after 1960, but
reported decisions indicate that the requirement applied to all applicants to the Patent Bar by
1990. Premysler v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 387, 389-90 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
105. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
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B. Licensing Benefits and Practitioner Quality
A second reason that the technical-education requirement likely provides
little economic benefit is that the correlation between patent practitioner quality
and the technical-education requirement is relatively weak.106 As described
previously, efficient occupational licensing typically requires licensing criteria that
correlate strongly with practitioner quality.107 However, Patent Bar membership
provides little assurance of technical competence because once a person becomes a
patent agent or attorney, she is not limited to working on matters related to the
technical credentials that allowed her to join. For example, a person may satisfy
the technical-education requirement by demonstrating that she has a degree in
biology, but thereafter is permitted to help an inventor prosecute a patent on an
invention unrelated to biology, like photocopier technology.108
As a result, the benefits of the Patent Bar (if any) likely are limited. In
some cases, clients can determine through other means whether technical
sophistication is important and, if so, whether particular members of the Patent Bar
possess it. For example, a sophisticated pharmaceutical innovator may determine
that knowledge of chemistry is important to representing the company in the
USPTO and accordingly hire a patent lawyer with a Ph.D. in chemistry. In such a
situation, the lawyer's Patent Bar membership provided little benefit to consumers
because the client selected the lawyer based on his particular educational
background not merely Patent Bar membership. In other cases, clients may fail to
appreciate the importance of technical sophistication and consequently hire agents
or attorneys with only marginally relevant backgrounds. In these cases, Patent Bar
membership again fails to provide substantial benefits to consumers.1 09 Moreover,
as described in the following subsections, many members of the Patent Bar
ultimately work on matters that are minimally related to the members' technical
backgrounds.
106. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 55-57, 71-73 and accompanying text.
108. Another shortcoming of the correlation between practitioner quality and the
Patent Bar may be that the USPTO does not require members of the Patent Bar to engage in
any continuing professional education. Carl Schwartz, What Patent Attorneys Should Know
About New Ethics Rules, LAw360 (May 10, 2013),
http://www.law360.com/articles/436597/what-patent-attomeys-should-know-about-new-
ethics-rules.
109. It is unlikely that a client would correctly determine that technical experience
is relevant to USPTO representation and then fail to correctly identify practitioners with
such a background. The costs of determining the technical backgrounds of members of the
Patent Bar are generally low. For instance, determining that a patent lawyer has a degree in
mechanical engineering rather than biology requires only a quick review of the lawyer's
resume.
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1. The Mismatch Between Technical Backgrounds and Patent-Eligible Subject
Matter
One reason that patent agents and attorneys work with technologies
falling outside of their areas of expertise is that the scope of patent-eligible subject
matter is broader than the educational backgrounds recognized by the USPTO.110
This problem is illustrated most starkly by design patents, which are a
type of patent that protects the invention of new ornamental, non-functional
designs."' The number of inventors seeking design patent protection has exploded
in recent years, more than quadrupling in the past three decades.1 12 Despite the
growing importance of design patents and although non-functional designs are
largely unrelated to the engineering and science backgrounds required by the
USPTO, only members of the Patent Bar can assist an inventor in prosecuting a
design patent. In contrast, those with specialized training in designs, like attorneys
with degrees in industrial design, are typically ineligible for Patent Bar
membership."
Likewise, patent agents and attorneys often help to prosecute functional
utility patents involving technologies unrelated to the technical backgrounds
supporting their Patent Bar membership. As described above, the credentials
required by the USPTO were established in the mid-twentieth century and thus
focus on then-extant technologies, so that today approximately 90% of Patent Bar
members have backgrounds in chemical, mechanical, biological, or electrical
110. Burke & Field, supra note 27, at 156-58 (discussing the admission of
computer science majors to the Patent Bar); Dale L. Carlson et al., Re-Thinking Patent Bar
Admission: Which Bag of Tools Rules?, 87 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 113, 137
(2005) (discussing the disconnect between the Bulletin and the law of patent-eligible subject
matter); Clifford et al., supra note 27, at 231-40; Corey B. Blake, Note, Ghost of the Past:
Does the USPTO's Scientific and Technical Background Requirement Still Make Sense?, 82
TEX. L. REv. 735, 762-65 (2004) (discussing the admission of business and design majors
to the Patent Bar).
111. 35 U.S.C. § 171(a) (2012); Apple Inc. v. Samsung Elecs., Co., 786 F.3d 983,
999 (Fed. Cir. 2015), rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 137 S. Ct. 429 (2016) (stating
that design patents cover only nonfunctional aspects of an invention). For example, Apple
famously obtained a design patent protecting, inter alia, a "rectangular product" with
"rounded corners." Id. at 992.
112. The USPTO issued 5,066 design patents in 1984 and 23,657 design patents
in 2014. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963-2014, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. (June 15, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/tafus_stat.htm.
113. 37 C.F.R. § 11.10(a) (2015) (stating that only members of the Patent Bar "are
permitted to prosecute patent applications of others before the Office"). The only reference
to the USPTO recognizing design credentials appears in one of the subcategories under
Category B, which states that an applicant can satisfy the technical-education requirement if
he or she has completed (i) 8 semester hours of chemistry or 8 semester hours of physics,
and (ii) 32 semester hours of chemistry, physics, biology, botany, microbiology, molecular
biology, or engineering. Of these thirty-two semester hours, "up to four semester hours will
be accepted for courses in design, engineering, or drafting." GENERAL REQUIREMENTS
BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 6.
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fields.114 In marked contrast, however, the Supreme Court has staunchly refused to
limit patent eligibility to these traditional technologies." Rather, recognizing that
"innovations progress in unexpected ways," the Court has held that patent law is
designed to promote invention even in new and unanticipated fields.116 Because
patent eligibility is not limited to traditional technologies, the credentials of
members of the Patent Bar inevitably fail to align with new areas of technology
that are eligible for patent protection. 17
For example, many software inventions have been patent eligible since at
least the mid-1980s, and today approximately 15% of the patents issued by the
USPTO relate to software inventions.' Despite the growing prominence of these
patents, the USPTO did not recognize computer science degrees as a qualifying
technical background until the mid-1990s.119 Even today, the USPTO only
recognizes specially accredited computer science degrees, and only does so if the
issuing university was specially accredited before the degree issued.12 0 As a result,
many computer science degrees do not qualify their recipients to join the Patent
Bar. The Massachusetts Institute of Technology ("MIT")-one of the premiere
technology universities in the world-was not accredited until 1996, thus people
who graduated from MIT with computer science degrees before 1996 are still
ineligible today for Patent Bar membership.121
The situation is worse for business method patents. Although the USPTO
issues thousands of business method patents each year, no business degrees satisfy
114. See Clifford et al., supra note 27, at 229; see also supra note 104 (discussing
the establishment of the technical-education requirement).
115. See infra Section II.D.3. Instead, the Court held that the only discoveries that
are ineligible for patent protection are laws of nature, natural phenomena, nd abstract
ideas. Id.
116. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 605 (2010); see also Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (stating that denying patent protection to "inventions
in areas not contemplated by Congress ... would frustrate the purposes of the patent laws");
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) (noting that "the ambit of applicable art in
given fields of science has widened by disciplines unheard of half a century ago").
117. The USPTO evidently does not dispute that the technical qualifications
required by the Bulletin become outdated as technology evolves. "The standards that appear
in the Bulletin reflect examples of the technical requirements that are currently acceptable.
These standards necessarily evolve because of changes in technology and the law." USPTO,
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER 5-6 (Apr. 30, 1994),
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/sol/foia/oed/tech/tech02.pdf.
118. James Bessen & Robert M. Hunt, An Empirical Look at Software Patents, 16
J. EcoN. & MGMT. STRATEGY 157, 158, 163 (2007) (estimating that 15% of patents granted
each year "[involve] a logic algorithm for processing data"); see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 605
(noting that "it was once forcefully argued that . . . 'well-established principles of patent law
probably would have prevented the issuance of a valid patent on almost any conceivable
computer program') (internal citations omitted).
119. See Burke & Field, supra note 27, at 150-51 (noting in 1995 that persons
with computer science degrees were not eligible to join the Patent Bar). The USPTO did not
hire an examiner with a degree in computer science until 1995. Scott Thurm, A Flood of
Web Patents Stirs Dispute Over Tactics, WALL ST. J., Oct. 9, 1998, at Bi.
120. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4.
121. Clifford et al., supra note 27, at 250-5 1.
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the requirements of the General Requirements Bulletin.1 2 2 Though some patent
practitioners may happen to have business degrees in addition to their traditional
technical backgrounds, most of the patent agents and attorneys who prosecute
business-method patents likely do not possess ubstantial training in business.1 2 3
2. Entrepreneurial Patent Practitioners
Market forces also encourage patent agents and attorneys to look beyond
their particular technical training when representing parties in the USPTO. Like
many businesses, patent practitioners may not be able to afford to be selective in
accepting clients. For example, a patent agent with a mechanical engineering
degree may prefer to assist an inventor who has discovered a new chemical
compound rather than to refer the inventor to another patent practitioner with a
degree in chemistry or chemical engineering. Although USPTO regulations
provide a code of ethics applicable to members, these regulations do not prevent a
patent practitioner from working on a patent matter involving unfamiliar
technologies if the practitioner delivers adequate service to the client.124 The patent
practitioner may simply need to spend additional time familiarizing herself with
the technology or enlist the help of someone more familiar with the technology,
perhaps even the inventor.
In some cases, where a patent agent or attorney works on a matter
involving technology that is distinct from his or her undergraduate degree, he or
she may nevertheless be utilizing portions of his or her education that are shared
by many science and engineering disciplines. For instance, students may take
introductory courses in physics while pursing degrees in chemistry, aeronautical
engineering, civil engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering,
chemical engineering, or industrial engineering. Accordingly, some portion of a
chemical engineer's education may be relevant to working on a patent matter
involving a mechanical invention.12 5 In such situations, the patent practitioner's
technical background may not be irrelevant to the invention, but it also provides
less benefit. Furthermore, if the benefit of the technical-education requirement is to
assure that practitioners possess the limited technical training common to many
engineering and science programs, then the social costs associated with the Patent
Bar are higher than necessary because many people with that minimal training are
122. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4-5; see, e.g., Maresca
v. Comm'r of Patents & Trademarks, 871 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d
80 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (affirming the USPTO's rejection of an application to take the Patent
Bar Exam because the applicant had a degree in Business Administration).
123. Clifford et al., supra note 27, at 257 (reporting that only 2.546% of patent
practitioners have business degrees).
124. 37 C.F.R. § 10.77 (2005); see infra notes 233-34 and accompanying text
(discussing the ethical obligations of members of the Patent Bar).
125. Indeed, the overlap between different technical fields may explain why the
USPTO allows a person to take the Patent Bar exam under Category B option 4, which
provides that a person is Patent Bar eligible if she has taken "40 semester hours in a
combination consisting of the following: 8 semester hours of chemistry or 8 semester hours
of physics, and 32 semester hours of chemistry, physics, biology, botany, microbiology,
molecular biology, or engineering." GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at
5.
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ineligible to join the Patent Bar due to the more rigorous standards of today's
Bulletin.12 6
C Licensing Benefits and Inventor Sophistication
A third reason that the technical-education requirement is unlikely to
provide substantial social benefits is that efficient occupational licensing typically
arises when consumers lack the sophistication to effectively evaluate the
credentials of service providers.12 7 Today, however, inventors as a group are more
sophisticated than ever before, at least insofar as the percentage of U.S. patents
issuing to independent inventors has steadily decreased.128 For example, in 1991
approximately 20% of patents issued to individual inventors, while the remaining
80% issued to corporations, businesses, universities, and non-profit institutions.129
By 2014, the percentage of patents issued to individual inventors dropped to only
6%.130 All other things being equal, institutional-patent recipients are more likely
to be sophisticated consumers of patent-practitioner services than individual
inventors. Businesses and universities often have savvy in-house counsel and
frequently are repeat players in the USPTO."' Moreover, institutional patent
recipients are more likely to have non-patent counsel that can assist in the selection
of an effective patent practitioner.
126. Unfortunately, it is difficult to quantify the extent that the technical
backgrounds of patent practitioners are unrelated to the patents they prosecute because an
invention may involve many different technologies, so that a patent practitioner's
background may be relevant o some but not all aspects of the technology. For example, a
medical device may involve mechanical, electrical, and chemical technologies, so that many
undergraduate degrees could be relevant to a medical device patent, including mechanical
engineering, electrical engineering, and chemistry.
127. See supra note 70 and accompanying text (arguing that occupational
licensing should be disfavored when market failures are not clearly present).
128. Typically, a patent application must be filed by the inventor. 35 U.S.C.
§ 111(a)(1) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.41(a) (2015). In addition, an inventor must submit with a
patent application an oath stating that the inventor "believes himself or herself to be the
original inventor or an original joint inventor of a claimed invention in the application." 35
U.S.C. § 115(b)(2) (2012). However, "[a] person to whom the inventor has assigned or is
under an obligation to assign the invention may make an application for patent." Id. § 118.
Moreover, an inventor can assign ownership of a patent during the pendency of an
application. Id. § 261.
129. Richard S. Gruner, Corporate Patents: Optimizing Organizational Responses
to Innovation Opportunities and Invention Discoveries, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1,
7 (2006).
130. See USPTO, ALL TECHNOLOGIES REPORT JANUARY 1991 - DECEMBER 2015,
at Al-1 (March 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf ll tech.pdf. Most
institutional patent recipients are corporations. See id. According to some patent law
scholars, the inventive contribution of independent inventors are "frequently hyped and
distorted." JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: How JUDGES,
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 166 (2008).
131. In addition, businesses are less likely to need paternalistic intervention.
Competition between businesses causes them to be more rationally self-interested. See
Hubbard, supra note 59, at 2066-70 (discussing the effect of competition on rational
decision-making).
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The vast majority of patent recipients are thus sophisticated actors who
are less likely to benefit from informational or paternalistic benefits from the
technical-education requirement. Independent inventors might benefit more, but
they account for an exceedingly small portion of patents each year. In fact, the
reduced role of independent inventors may stem, in part, from the restrictive nature
of the Patent Bar and the resulting high costs of obtaining the services of a patent
agent or attorney. Rather than assuring independent inventors that their patent
practitioners are more qualified, the technical-education requirement may prevent
some independent inventors from obtaining any patent representation at all.132
D. Licensing Costs and Legal Expertise
A fourth reason that the technical-education requirement is difficult to
justify economically is that the requirement raises the costs of obtaining patent
representation in the USPTO by limiting the pool of practitioners who possess an
increasingly valuable credential: legal sophistication. As described above,
occupational licensing often raises costs for customers to obtain services because
only service providers who have invested in obtaining the required credentials will
be able to provide the services." Consequently, patent practitioners with legal
expertise are doubly expensive to hire because relatively few people possess both
legal and technical credentials.134 The result is that patent-attorney billing rates are
generally higher than those of agents and many non-Patent-Bar-member
lawyers." Some inventors and potential infringers may not be able to afford these
more expensive services and therefore may not pursue certain matters in the
USPTO.1 36 Indeed, the Patent Bar may further exacerbate problems stemming
from insufficient legal sophistication because it suggests that patent agents without
legal training are nevertheless capable of handling legally complex issues in the
USPTO."' Inventors may be particularly susceptible to problems of legal
unsophistication because, although inventors are often technically astute, they
typically lack legal training."
In the past, limiting the pool of lawyers who could represent inventors in
the USPTO may not have substantially raised costs because legal skills may not
132. Some independent inventors may be electing trade secret protection in lieu of
patent protection, but these two forms of intellectual property are not perfect substitutes. See
Hubbard, supra note 1, at 1959.
133. See supra notes 65-68 and accompanying text.
134. See infra note 135 and accompanying text.
135. AIPLA 2013, supra note 3, at 1-8; see supra notes 14-15 and accompanying
text (discussing median salaries for patent agents, non-patent lawyers, and patent attorneys).
136. Shapiro, supra note 30, at 844.
137. "Poorly designed licensing laws may injure consumers by providing a false
assurance of quality." Ribstein, supra note 55, at 306.
138. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (noting that informational
asymmetries are more likely when expertise is required to evaluate service quality); see also
supra note 60 (stating that paternalistic occupational licensing is more likely justified when
expertise is needed to evaluate service quality). Independent inventors are particularly less
likely to be legally sophisticated. Most patents today, however, issue to corporations, which
are more likely to be more legally sophisticated. See supra Section II.C (discussing the
increasing sophistication of patent owners).
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have been important to effectively assist inventors. In the early twentieth century,
some commentators asserted that "knowledge of the invention is more important
than knowledge of [patent law]."139 Indeed, a law degree has never been a
requirement to represent inventors in the USPTO, and for many inventors, patent
agents provide a cheaper alternative to patent attorneys.140 Others in the past have
disagreed, asserting that he resolution of legal issues was central to the work of
patent agents and attorneys.141 For example, the Supreme Court asserted in 1892
that a patent application is "one of the most difficult legal instruments to [draft]
with accuracy."14 Likewise, in 1963, the Court confirmed that "the preparation
and prosecution of patent applications for others constitutes the practice of law." 143
Regardless of whether the work of patent practitioners historically was
more technical or legal, today, legal expertise has become particularly important.
Now, innovators seeking representation in the USPTO often need both legal and
technical expertise. The following subsections detail some aspects of patent law
that recently have become more legally complex.
1. Patent Challenges in the USPTO
One important aspect of the work of patent agents and attorneys that has
changed in recent years is the extent to which members of the Patent Bar are
involved in post-grant litigation in the USPTO. When the technical-education
requirement was established in the mid-twentieth century, all challenges to patent
validity took place through district court litigation. 144 Unfortunately, district court
patent litigation was enormously expensive and time consuming-as it still is
today. 145 As a result, for more than 30 years, Congress has sought to shift validity
disputes from the district courts to administrative adjudications in the USPTO
where Congress hopes that fights are cheaper and faster. As described below, these
efforts appear to be succeeding as litigants are bringing increasing numbers of
validity actions in the USPTO. In these proceedings, members of the Patent Bar
perform work akin to patent litigation, which is legally intricate and has never
required a technical education.
Congress established the first administrative alternatives to district court
litigation in 1980 in the form of "reexamination" proceedings.146 These ex parte
proceedings were designed to allow the USPTO to quickly and cheaply correct
139. COMM'R OF PATENTS, ANNUAL REPORT, at xiv (1915),
http://1ibrary.si.edu/digital-library/book/annualreportofc 1915 unit.
140. 37 C.F.R. § 11.6(b) (2012).
141. WILLARD PHILLIPS, THE LAW OF PATENTS FOR INVENTIONS; INCLUDING THE
REMEDIES AND LEGAL PROCEEDINGS IN RELATION TO PATENT RIGHTS 232 (1837); Swanson,
supra note 89, at 534-35.
142. Topliff v. Topliff, 145 U.S. 156, 171 (1892).
143. Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379, 383 (1963).
144. See supra note 104 (establishing that the technical-education requirement
was established between 1908 and 1963 in regards to patent agents).
145. Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881, 890-95 (2015).




mistakes made in the initial examination of a patent application.1 47 More
specifically, in a reexamination, the USPTO would consider a "substantial new
question of patentability," though the USPTO could not consider certain validity
challenges, like a claim that the subject matter of a discovery is ineligible for
patent protection. 148
Although the USPTO has granted more than 11,000 requests for
reexamination since 1981, experts have perceived reexamination procedures as
underutilized.149 Congress hoped that the USPTO would reexamine several
thousand patents each year, but in actuality, the Office on average reexamined only
several hundred.150 One explanation for the shortfall was the ex parte nature of
reexamination."1 Although anyone could request that the USPTO initiate a
reexamination, once the proceedings had begun, they were conducted like a
normal patent-application examination. As a result, even a third party that
successfully requested a reexamination could not participate in the subsequent
proceedings.1 5 2
In 1999, Congress responded to this concern by creating a new inter
partes version of reexamination proceedings.' Initially, these actions were
seldom used because they were only available for patents filed in 1999 or later.15 4
Soon, however, the USPTO began granting an increasing number of requests for
inter partes reexaminations. In 2012 alone, the USPTO initiated more than 500
inter partes reexaminations. 15
In some respects, inter partes reexamination provided a more favorable
avenue for challenging patents than district court litigation. To start, in district
court litigation patents are presumed valid, and any invalidity claim must be
supported by clear and convincing evidence.1 56 In contrast, a patent challenger in
an inter partes reexamination needed only to prove invalidity by a preponderance
147. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, pt. 1, at 3-4 (1980), as reprinted in
1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6463 ("Reexamination will permit efficient resolution of
questions about he validity of issued patents without recourse to expensive and lengthy
infringement litigation.").
148. See 35 U.S.C. § 303 (2012); infra Section II.D.3 (discussing patent-eligible
subject matter).
149. USPTO, Ex PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA 1 (Sept. 30, 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/expartehistorical stats roll up.pdf;
Dolin, supra note 145, at 895-96.
150. See USPTO, Ex PARTE REEXAMINATION FILING DATA, supra note 149;
Dolin, supra note 145, at 895-96.
151. Dolin, supra note 145, at 902-09.
152. USPTO, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION 2 (2004),
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/dcom/olia/reports/reexamreport.pdf.
153. American Inventors Protection Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat.
1501 (codified in relevant part in 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-318 (2006) and repealed in 2012).
154. Id. § 4608.
155. USPTO, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION HISTORICAL STATISTICS 3 (Sept. 30,
2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/interparte historicalstats_roll up
EOY2013.pdf.
156. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P'ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
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of the evidence.1 7  Moreover, patents received broader constructions in
reexaminations than in district court litigation. In district court litigation, the scope
of a patent is determined by considering the perspective of a person of ordinary
skill in the art, while in a reexamination proceeding the validity of a patent is
evaluated based on the broadest reasonable interpretation of the patent.1 5 8 Ceteris
peribus, broader patents are more likely to be invalid.159
Despite these advantages for patent challengers, litigants rarely
considered inter partes reexamination to be an attractive alternative to district
court litigation. One reason for this underutilization was that an accused defendant
in a pending district court lawsuit could not use inter partes reexamination to
shorten or prevent district court litigation: a party that initiated an inter partes
reexamination was not entitled to stay a parallel lawsuit.160 In theory, an accused
infringer could use a reexamination to invalidate a patent and thus render the
parallel district court litigation moot, but this outcome was unlikely for two
reasons. First, when reexaminations and lawsuits took place concurrently, the
reexamination was unlikely to conclude first, as the average duration for a
reexamination was about three years and most patent lawsuits in the district courts
reached the trial stage in only two-and-a-half years.161 Second, because some
invalidity defenses could not be raised in reexaminations, alleged infringers were
often forced to pursue parallel litigation through district courts.162 In many cases,
potential infringers of patents thus used reexaminations as a supplement for district
court litigation, not a substitute.163 Patent owners likewise had little reason to
157. In re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
158. Id. at 1377-78.
159. Dolin, supra note 145, at 916 (noting that broader patents are more likely to
be invalid).
160. Procter & Gamble Co. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc., 549 F.3d 842, 848-49
(Fed. Cir. 2008) (stating that district courts have discretion as to whether to stay a suit in
light of an inter partes reexamination). Stays of litigation pending the outcome of a
reexamination, however, were not uncommon.
161. Compare USPTO, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION HISTORICAL STATISTICS
(2013), http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/interparte historicalstatsroll up
EOY2013.pdf (stating that the average duration of an inter partes reexamination was thirty-
six months), with PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS LLP, 2011 PATENT LITIGATION STUDY:
PATENT LITIGATION TRENDS AS THE "AMERICA INVENTS ACT" BECOMES LAw 27-28 (2011),
http://www.aipla.org/resources2/intlip/Documents/Other-International-Events/US-Bar-JPO-
Liaison-Council-2012/2011-patent-litigation-study.pdf (reporting that the median time-to-
trial for patent lawsuits is two-and-a-half years).
162. See supra note 148 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 173-175 and
accompanying text (describing limitations on the invalidity arguments that could be raised
in reexaminations).
163. See Bettcher Indus. v. Bunzi USA, Inc., 661 F.3d 629, 647 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(stating that "Congress intended that reexaminations and civil patent litigation could occur
in parallel . . . ."). In an effort to reduce the extent that arguments in reexaminations were
repeated in district court litigation, Congress provided that a party that initiates an inter
partes reexamination was estopped from asserting "at any time, in any civil action arising in
whole or in part ... the invalidity of any [patent] claim finally determined to be valid and
patentable on any ground which the third party requester raised or could have raised during
the inter partes reexamination proceedings." 35 U.S.C. § 315(c) (2012). This estoppel does
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prefer inter partes reexamination over litigation. While a patent owner was
authorized by statute to obtain a stay of a district court suit pending the outcome of
an inter partes reexamination,1 64 the patent owner typically would prefer district
court litigation given the more patent friendly validity standards of that forum.
In an effort to make administrative proceedings in the USPTO more-
attractive alternatives to district court litigation, in 2011 Congress replaced inter
partes reexamination with three new administrative proceedings for challenging
the validity of issued patents: post-grant review, inter partes review, and covered
business method review.165 The contexts in which these different proceedings can
be initiated depend on the technology covered by patents and the dates that patents
issued. Covered business method reviews apply only to business method patents
and can be initiated at any time during such a patent's life, though the patent laws
supporting covered business method review are set to expire in 2020.166 Post-grant
reviews are not limited to a particular type of technology but must be initiated
within nine months of a patent's issuance.167 Any later challenges must be brought
through an inter partes review.1 68
All of the new proceedings preserve the features of reexamination
favoring invalidity challenges. Patents are evaluated using the "broadest
reasonable construction," and invalidity must be proven only by a preponderance
of the evidence rather than the clear-and-convincing standard applicable in district
court litigation.1 69 Procedural aspects of the new proceedings, however, are
markedly different from inter partes reexaminations. For the most part,
reexaminations were conducted using the same procedures used by the USPTO
not attach, however, until all of the appeals rights related to a reexamination have been
exhausted, including the appeal of a reexamination within the USPTO and later to the
Federal Circuit Court of Appeals, which is a process that can take many years. Bettcher
Indus., 661 F.3d at 642-48. As a result, the estoppel that could arise from inter partes
reexaminations often had little impact on district court litigation.
164. See 35 U.S.C. § 318 (2006) (amended 2012).
165. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6, 18, 125 Stat.
284 (2011). This Article highlights some of the relevant differences between inter partes
reexamination and the administrative procedures created by Congress in 2011, but a full
description of these differences is beyond the scope of this Article.
166. Id. § 18(a)(1)(A); 35 U.S.C. § 321(c) (2012). Covered business method
reviews can only be initiated by a party that "has been sued for infringement of the patent or
has been charged with infringement under that patent." Unlike with post-grant review and
inter partes review, Congress did not describe the features of covered business reviews in
separate statutory sections. Instead, Congress e tablished covered business method review
as a "transitional" program and stated that covered business method reviews "shall employ
the standards and procedures of, a postgrant review." Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1).
167. 35 U.S.C. § 321(c).
168. Id. § 311(c) (2012).
169. Id. §§ 316(e), 326(e) (2012); 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b) (2017); see
In re Cuozzo Speed Techs., LLC, 793 F.3d 1268, 1277 (Fed. Cir. 2015). For patents that are
set to expire before the conclusion of a post-grant review, the USPTO does not apply the
broadest reasonable construction and instead applies a claim construction process akin to
that used in district court litigation. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 42.100(b), 42.200(b), 42.300(b).
412
20171 RAZING THE PATENT BAR 413
when reviewing a patent application.170 For example, while a party in an inter
partes reexamination could submit fact witness and expert affidavits, discovery
was not allowed.1 7 1 In contrast, the new administrative proceedings are
"adjudicatory in nature and [constitute] litigation." 172 Because Congress sought to
provide a cheaper alternative to district court litigation, parties are allowed limited
discovery in the new administrative procedures.1 73
Moreover, the new procedures expand the grounds that can be considered
for invalidating a patent. Inter partes reexamination procedures were limited to
"substantial new questions of patentability," thus prohibiting a potential infringer
from raising a validity issue that the USPTO considered in the initial examination
that produced the patent.174 The new administrative procedures eliminate this
limitation, thereby allowing adversarial exploration of validity issues that had only
been considered ex parte by an initial patent examiner. 17' The older reexamination
procedures were also restricted to claims that a patent was invalid because it was
identical to or only trivially different from other patents or printed publications.1 76
With both post-grant review and covered business method review, however, patent
challengers can now assert any invalidity critique that could be made in federal
court.177
Perhaps even more importantly, a potential infringer can effectively
forestall district court litigation by initiating one of the new administrative
proceedings because these proceedings are required to conclude in most cases
within one year, with a maximum extension of six months for "good cause."178 As
a result, even if the administrative proceeding occurs in parallel with district court
170. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a) (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 1.937(b) (2017); see also STERNE,
KESSLER, GOLDSTEIN, & Fox, P.L.L.C., PATENT OFFICE LITIGATION 188 (Robert Greene
Sterne et al., eds., 2012) (noting that reexaminations were "essentially examinational in
nature").
171. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.132 (2017).
172. Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, No. IPR 2013-00191, at 4
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2014), http://patentdocs.typepad.com/files/246134.pdf; Idle Free Sys.,
Inc. v. Bergstrom, Inc., No IPR 2012-0027, at 6 (P.T.A.B. June 11, 2013) ("An inter partes
review is more adjudicatory than examinational[] in nature.").
173. In post-grant reviews and covered business method reviews, discovery is
"limited to evidence directly related to factual assertions advanced by either party in the
proceeding." 35 U.S.C. § 326(a)(5) (2012). In inter partes review, discovery is limited to
"relevant evidence," though only witnesses who submit affidavits or declarations can be
deposed. Id. § 316(a)(5) (2012); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.51 (2017) (describing the discovery
allowed and required in trials before the Patent Trial and Appeal Board).
174. 35 U.S.C. § 312 (2008) (amended 2011); In re NTP, Inc., 654 F.3d 1268,
1275 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
175. 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (2012). In fact, 69% of recent petitions to initiate inter
partes review are based at least in part on prior art that was already considered by the patent
examiner in the initial examination of the patent. Dolin, supra note 145, at 928.
176. 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-12 (2012) (current version at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-12
(2013)).
177. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, §18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
178. 35 U.S.C. §§ 316(a)(11), 326(a)(11) (2012).
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litigation, the proceeding in the USPTO will usually conclude well before the
district court litigation.1 7 9
Early measures of utilization are still emerging because inter partes
review has only been available since September 2012, and post-grant review and
covered business method review can only apply to patents filed after March
2013.1so Nevertheless, by all accounts, it appears that litigants are utilizing the new
USPTO procedures in substantially greater numbers than inter partes
reexamination. At its peak, the USPTO initiated 530 inter partes reexaminations
per year.' In 2015, the USPTO instituted more than 1,300 post-grant reviews,
covered business method reviews, and inter partes reviews combined.182
Inventors and potential infringers will also need to be advised regarding
the complex interplay between patent challenges in the USPTO, suits in the district
courts, and International Trade Commission investigations. For example, by
statute, a party cannot initiate any of the new USPTO procedures if it has already
initiated a lawsuit in district court challenging the validity of the patent. 183
Moreover, if a party challenges the validity of a patent through administrative
proceedings in the USPTO, and that challenge produces an initial decision, then
that party will be barred from raising invalidity claims that it "raised or reasonably
could have raised" in the USPTO litigation in parallel district court litigation or
related International Trade Commission investigations.184 Additionally, in some
cases, administrative proceedings will proceed in parallel with district court
litigation regarding the same patents, so that the same legal issues arise in the
USPTO and the courts.8 5
As a result, an increasing number of patent practitioners will be asked to
provide legal advice regarding proceedings simultaneously in the USPTO, the
International Trade Commission, and district courts. Importantly, in all of these
new administrative proceedings, the USPTO requires that lead counsel in
proceedings be a member of the Patent Bar.186 Additional attorneys who are not
179. See infra note 185 and accompanying text.
180. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, §§ 6(c)(2)(A),
6(f)(2)(A), 18, 125 Stat. 284 (2011).
181. USPTO, INTER PARTES REEXAMINATION HISTORICAL STATISTICS 1 (Sept. 30,
2013),
http://www.uspto.gov/patents/stats/interpartehistoricalstats roll up_EOY2013.pdf.
182. USPTO, PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD STATISTICS 3 (Dec. 31, 2015),
http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-12-31%/`20PTAB.pdf.
183. 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), 325(a)(1) (2012).
184. Id. §§ 315(e)(2), 325(e)(2).
185. In some cases, administrative proceedings cannot proceed in parallel with
district court litigation. For example, if a patent challenger initiates an inter partes review
and thereafter files a civil action in district court challenging the validity of the patent, the
civil action will be automatically stayed until the patent owner moves to lift the stay or files
a civil action asserting infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2). Similarly, a patent challenger
cannot initiate an inter partes review if he or she has already filed a civil action seeking to
invalidate a patent or has waited more than a year since the start of an infringement suit by
the patent owner. Id.
186. 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(a), (c) (2017).
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members of the Patent Bar can be admitted pro hac vice, but lead counsel must be
present for much of the proceedings.'1 7 Thus, increasing numbers of patent
practitioners will be involved in USPTO adjudications involving complex legal
issues, including issues of procedure, evidence, substantive patent law, and
litigation strategy. 8 8
2. Obviousness
Much of the work of patent agents and attorneys in the USPTO centers on
patent prosecution, including drafting patent applications, responding to patent
examiners' rejections and critiques, and amending applications. Although this
process has always involved both technical and legal issues, patent agents and
attorneys today must apply more sophisticated legal analyses to patent prosecution
than was required in the past.
For example, the U.S. Supreme Court has rendered more complex the law
related to a core feature of patent law known as "obviousness."1 89 In order for an
inventor to obtain a patent, he or she must show that the invention not only is new,
but also is not an "obvious" variation of "prior art," that is, existing
technologies.190 The obviousness requirement is perhaps the biggest hurdle
inventors' face to obtaining patent rights. Indeed, it is the most common basis for
invalidating issued patents.1 91
Oftentimes, a new invention can be conceptualized as a combination of
multiple prior art references in that every feature of the invention appears in a
known source though no single prior art reference discloses the entire invention.
Sometimes, such a combination is trivial, as in the case where a manufacturer
simply alters existing technology to include an equivalent but distinct material. For
example, the first person to develop a porcelain doorknob was unable to obtain a
patent in light of existing metal doorknob technology and the well-known
similarities between metal and porcelain.192 Other times, however, a particular
hybridization of known technologies is the product of great insight and
187. Id.; Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., No. IPR 2012-00042, at 2
(P.T.A.B.. Oct. 31, 2013) ("The Board expects lead counsel for each party to be present at
hearing, although any backup counsel may make the actual presentation, in whole or in
part."); see, e.g., Google Inc. v. Jongerius Panoramic Techs., LLC, No. IPR2013-00191, at 5
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 13, 2014) (granting a motion in an inter partes review to admit pro hac vice
an attorney who is not a member of the Patent Bar); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2017)
(defining "trial" in the USPTO). Although individuals who are parties to administrative
proceedings in the USPTO can proceed pro se, corporations must be represented by counsel.
37 C.F.R. § 1.31 (2017).
188. 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(c) (2017).
189. KSR Int'l v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
190. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2012); see also id. § 102 (2012) (defining prior art).
191. John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of
Litigated Patents, 26 AM. INTELL. PROP. L.Q. 185, 192 (1998).
192. Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1851).
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inspiration.193 Distinguishing between obvious and nonobvious combinations of
prior art references is particularly difficult due to hindsight bias, that is, the natural
tendency to underestimate the difficulty of correct decision-making once an
answer is already known.1 94
In light of these challenges, for many years courts considered
combinations of prior art references to be nonobvious unless some prior art
reference provided a particular "teaching, suggestion, or motivation" to combine
the two existing technologies ("TSM" for short).1 95 Thus, a patent agent or
attorney facing an obviousness rejection from a patent examiner based on a
combination of prior art references could relatively easily overcome the rejection
by insisting that the examiner provide prior art showing TSM to combine the
references.1 96 Without such a TSM roadmap, the examiner's obviousness rejection
would fail.
In 2007 in KSR International v. Teleflex, Inc., however, the Supreme
Court rejected the bright-line certainty of the TSM test in favor of "an expansive
and flexible approach."1 97 While the Court agreed that combinations of prior art
references supported by TSM are obvious, the Court also held that additional
combinations of known technologies might nonetheless be obvious, including
combinations requiring only "ordinary creativity" and combinations that are
"obvious to try."1 98 Patent practitioners facing obviousness rejections today thus
must grapple with the KSR decision and its progeny rather than simply relying on
TSM.
The Supreme Court's expanded test for obviousness compounded
additional legal complexities. Even before KSR, a prior art reference could only be
used for an obviousness challenge if it was considered "analogous" to the
invention in that the reference either came from the same "field of endeavor"1 99 as
the invention or was "reasonably pertinent o the problem addressed by [the
invention]."200 While "field of endeavor" and "reasonably pertinent" have always
been open-textured concepts, the TSM requirement tempered any vagueness.
Typically, there are few teachings, suggestions, or motivations to combine
193. E.g., United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39 (1966) (holding that the design of
a battery was not obvious even though the battery used both electrodes and electrolytes
found in the prior art).
194. KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 421. See generally Gregory Mandel, Patently Non-
Obvious: Empirical Demonstration that the Hindsight Bias Renders Patent Decisions
Irrational, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 1391, 1394 (2006) (arguing that hindsight bias affects
obviousness determinations).
195. KSR Int'l, 550 U.S. at 399.
196. See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that the patent
examiner bears the burden of demonstrating that a patent application should not issue).
197. 550 U.S at 415; see also Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An
Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557 (1992) (discussing the cost/benefit differences
between rules and standards).
198. A complete analysis of the ramifications of the KSR decision is beyond the
scope of this Article.
199. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
200. Id. at 1379.
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technologies from disparate "fields of endeavor" or technologies that were not
"reasonably pertinent to the problem" addressed by the invention. After KSR,
however, patent prosecutors can no longer rely on TSM to cabin the scope of
analogous technologies and instead must engage directly with the law regarding
"field of endeavor" and "reasonable pertinen[ce]."
3. Patent-Eligible Subject Matter
A third area where patent agents and attorneys must apply more nuanced
legal analyses than in the past is in determining whether an invention is the type of
discovery that is eligible for patent protection. The U.S. Supreme Court has long
held that patent protection is unavailable for three types of discoveries: laws of
nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.201 The Court has eschewed
expanding the list of categories that are excluded from patent protection, holding,
for instance, that living creatures and business methods are eligible for patent
protection.202
The scope of the three categorical exclusions from patent eligibility is
legally complex. For example, while it may be clear that a general mathematical
principle like addition is an abstract idea, it is less clear whether particular uses of
mathematical principles are abstract ideas, such as the financial concepts of
hedging or intermediated settlement.203 A further challenge in defining the scope
of the three categorical exclusions is that patent-ineligible subject matter underlies
all inventions: "At some level, 'all inventions . . . embody, use, reflect, rest upon,
or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas."204 For instance,
traditional machines like the cotton gin are ultimately based on laws of nature, like
friction, momentum, and leverage. Similarly, each step in a detailed software
algorithm involves abstract ideas like addition, subtractions, multiplication, and
division. Some inventions may differ only trivially from ineligible subject matter
and accordingly should, themselves, be ineligible for patent protection, while other
inventions are sufficiently different from the excluded categories that they should
be eligible for patent protection. Unfortunately, the difference between trivial and
substantive applications of ineligible subject matter is a matter of degree and thus
difficult to consistently identify.
The Supreme Court has addressed the law of patent-eligible subject
matter in four separate cases since 20 10.205 The Court's treatment of these
concepts, however, involves nuanced legal analysis. For example, in Bilski v.
Kappos, the Court declined to hold that business methods are per se patent
ineligible, instead holding that only business methods that happen to fall in the
categorical exclusions should be ineligible for patent protection. Rather than
201. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
202. Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 609 (2010); Diamond, 447 U.S. at 306.
203. The Supreme Court held that both are abstract ideas. See Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int'l, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2355 (2014) (intermediated settlement); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 609
(hedging).
204. Alice Corp, 134 S. Ct. at 2354.
205. Id. at 2357; Ass'n. for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S.
Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289
(2012); Bilski, 561 U.S. at 593.
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adopting an easy-to-apply, bright-line rule, the Court directed litigants to identify
patent-ineligible business methods by applying other Supreme Court decisions,
stating that "[t]he Court.. need not define further what constitutes a patentable
'process,' beyond pointing to the definition of that term provided in [the Patent
Act] and looking to the guideposts of [three previous Supreme Court cases]."2 06
Similarly, in later cases, the Court held that an "inventive concept" is the critical
distinction between substantial and trivial applications of ineligible subject matter,
though the meaning of "inventive concept" remains elusive.2 07
Patent agents and attorneys thus must grapple with nuanced legal
arguments in asserting the patent eligibility of some inventions. Moreover,
technology has evolved so that issues of patent eligibility arise with greater
frequency than in the past. For instance, concerns with patent eligibility often arise
with patents on software and genetic testing, technologies that did not exist when
the foundations of the Patent Bar were laid in the twentieth century.2 08
E. Licensing Costs and the Slow Growth of the Patent Bar
A final reason that the technical-education requirement is difficult to
justify on economic grounds is that, in recent years, it has prevented the size of the
Patent Bar from keeping pace with the growth in the demand for patent
practitioner services, and this shortfall in the labor market ultimately produces
higher prices and greater social costs.209 As described in the Introduction, only
about 26,000 attorneys and agents are members of the Patent Bar and actively
represent clients today. This small group of practitioners enjoys exclusive access to
a lucrative market for legal services.2 10 Nevertheless, 2014 saw the smallest
number of new admissions to the Patent Bar in a decade, with less than 1,200
people taking and passing the Patent Bar exam.2 1 1 In contrast to the slow growth in
the Patent Bar, the number of patent applications filed each year has steadily
increased, so that today the USPTO receives 47% more applications than it did a
decade ago.2 12
206. Bilski, 561 U.S. at 612.
207. Alice Corp, 134 S. Ct. at 2357.
208. Id. (software); Ass'n. for Molecular Pathology, 133 S. Ct. at 2107 (genetics);
Mayo Collaborative Servs., 132 S. Ct. at 1289 (medical diagnostics).
209. See supra notes 65-67 and accompanying text (describing the costs
stemming from occupational icensing).
210. See supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
211. Exam Results, USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/ip/boards/oed/exam/past/
results/#heading-1 (last visited Mar. 6, 2017). In both 2008 and 2009, more than 2,000
people were admitted to the Patent Bar. Id. By contrast, approximately 40,000 people
become lawyers each year. Joshua Wright, The Job Market for Lawyers: Side Work on the
Rise Amid Continuing Glut of New Grads, FORBES (Jan. 10, 2014, 11:20 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/emsi/2014/01/10/the-job-market-for-lawyers-side-work-on-
the-rise-amid-continuing-glut-of-new-grads/#3b2074dl6d07.
212. U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 - 2015, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. (June 15, 2016), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/
tafus stat.htm.
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The technical-education requirement is likely a major cause of the
relatively slow growth in the number of patent agents and attorneys admitted to
practice before the USPTO. To start, the percentage of U.S. college students
graduating with engineering and science degrees has remained largely unchanged
in recent years. In 2000, 16.8% of graduates received degrees in engineering or the
natural sciences, compared to 16.2% in 2011 .213 The slow growth in the Patent Bar
also stems from a further decline in the number of students with engineering and
science backgrounds that are enrolling in law school. Nationwide, the number of
students applying to law school has dropped precipitously. Between 2008 and
2012 the number of students taking the LSAT decreased by 31%.214 Among
students whose undergraduate degrees automatically satisfy the technical-
education requirement, however, the decline was even sharper-a decrease of
46%.215 And although representing inventors and their competitors in the USPTO
requires increasing legal sophistication, a smaller percentage of patent practitioners
possesses ubstantial legal training.2 1 6 Thus, in part due to the technical-education
requirement, the Patent Bar may fail to keep up with the growth in the demand for
patent services in the USPTO.
III. EFFICIENTLY EXPANDING THE PATENT BAR
The technical-education requirement thus cannot be justified on the basis
of economic efficiency. The requirement likely provides little benefit given that
market failures have not been shown to exist in the market for representation in the
USPTO.2 1 7 In addition, Patent Bar membership provides little assurance of
practitioner quality, and the costs of limiting the size of the Patent Bar have grown
in recent years.28 As a result, the Patent Bar, as currently constituted, may not be
efficiently supporting inventors and their competitors in the USPTO. Accordingly,
this Part proposes a simple expansion to the Patent Bar, reviews previous efforts to
reform the Patent Bar, and lays out a likely plan for implementing the
recommendation.
A. A Proposal for Expansion
To maximize social welfare, the Patent Bar should be expanded to allow
any attorney who is a member in good standing of a state bar to take the Patent Bar
213. NAT'L Sci. BD., 2014 SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 59 tbl.2-17
(2014), http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seindl4/content/appendix/at.pdf. Some of these
degrees would not presumptively satisfy the USPTO's technical-education requirement,
such as mathematics. See GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 7.
214. End-of-year Summary: ABA (Applicants, Applications & Admissions),
LSATs, Credential Assembly Service, LSAC, http://www.1sac.org/1sacresources/data/Isac-
volume-summary (last visited Mar. 6, 2017).
215. Port et al., supra note 27, at 196-97 ("In fact, the decrease of patent bar
eligible students far exceeds the decrease ofnon-patent bar eligible law students.").
216. Id.; see also Dennis Crouch, Attorney v. Agent, PATENTLY-O (Aug. 24,
2010), http://patentlyo.com/patent/2010/08/attorney-versus-agent.html.
217. See supra Sections II.A, II.C.
218. See supra Sections I.B, lI.D, II.E.
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exam, and to join the Patent Bar upon successful passage of that test.21 9 Under this
proposal, the technical-education requirement would only apply as a licensing
requirement to nonlawyers seeking to become patent agents. Additionally, lawyers
who satisfy the technical-education requirement would be certified as
"Science/Technology Specialists."
This proposal addresses many of the concerns raised above. To start, it
would relax a market regulation that has not been economically justified. In doing
so, it would expand the supply of patent services in the USPTO, thereby reducing
the costs for innovators and other parties.220 In fact, many attorneys who would be
newly eligible to join the Patent Bar may be cheaper than current patent
practitioners. As noted in the Introduction, the median salary for attorneys today is
less than that of patent agents or patent attorneys.22 1 Even parties that can afford
patent agents may prefer to hire attorneys even if they lack extensive technical
training. For instance, an invention might be relatively uncomplicated, such as in
the case of a simple mechanical device or a business method.22 2 Even with more
complex inventions, a party might prefer to hire a legally adroit attorney if the
party can help the attorney to understand the technical details.2 2 3 Alternatively, a
party might decide to hire a team that includes both technically sophisticated
patent agents and legally sophisticated attorneys.2 24 Some cost-sensitive parties
may also prefer to hire technically unsophisticated lawyers in cases where legal
issues predominate over technical issues. Finally, this proposal would particularly
increase the number of Patent Bar members with experience in fields of invention
that are patent eligible but are not currently recognized by the USPTO as
supporting Patent Bar membership, such as business and industrial design.22 5
In addition to expanding the supply of services in the USPTO, this
proposal is unlikely to generate the types of costs that occupational licensing
regimes are designed to limit. To start, for many years, and apparently without
incident, lawyers were eligible to join the Patent Bar, regardless of their technical
219. See Richard Spencer, The Patent Lawyer and the General Practitioner, 81 U.
PA. L. REv. 924, 936 (1933) (suggesting a similar proposal, but grounded on different
justifications).
220. The extent to which attorneys would decide to join the Patent Bar under this
proposal is unclear. See Kleiner, supra note 30, at 192 ("Individuals who attempt to enter
the occupation . . .will need to balance the economic rents of the fields increased monopoly
power against the greater difficulty of meeting the entrance requirements."). Certainly, a
claim that few additional attorneys would actually join the Patent Bar under this proposal
provides little reason not to implement it. If few attorneys join the Patent Bar, any potential
costs stemming from this proposal would likewise be small.
221. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
222. Inventions that are the subject of design patents also are not technically
sophisticated. See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text (discussing design patents).
223. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting
that "inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention").
224. Current USPTO regulations allow attorneys who are not members of the
Patent Bar to appear pro hac vice in post-grant administrative proceedings. 37 C.F.R.
§ 42.10(a), (c) (2017); see also 37 C.F.R. § 42.2 (2017) (defining "trial" in the USPTO).
225. See supra Section II.B.1.
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training.2 26 Furthermore, this proposal will not make it more difficult for parties to
assess the credentials of members of the Patent Bar. For agents, Patent Bar
membership will continue to demonstrate that the agent possesses the technical
qualifications endorsed by the USPTO. Likewise, parties can easily determine
whether attorneys satisfy the USPTO's technical standards because those attorneys
will have the additional certification of Science/Technology Specialist.2 2 7 Armed
with this information, market participants would be as able to identify and hire
technologically appropriate patent practitioners as under the current regime.2 28 In
many cases, parties likely would choose to hire agents or attorneys who satisfy the
technical-education requirement. For example, some patent applications will be
both legally and technically complex, and inventors for such applications will
continue to hire patent attorneys with sophisticated technical backgrounds to assist
in the prosecution of these applications. Other times, however, parties may prefer
to have the option of hiring attorneys without technical training, and under the
proposed reform, market forces, rather than government fiat, would determine
which practitioners are hired.
In fact, many parties seeking patent representation i the USPTO are well
positioned to assess whether attorneys who lack the technical or scientific
backgrounds currently required by the USPTO could nevertheless effectively work
on matters related to certain inventions because many of those parties are
themselves technically sophisticated.2 29 Today, the vast majority of parties seeking
representation in the USPTO are sophisticated actors, like corporations and
universities.
Admittedly, if the proposed expansion of the Patent Bar educes the costs
of representation in the USPTO, more small companies and independent inventors
may seek to hire members of the Patent Bar. While these parties may be less
sophisticated in some senses, as inventors and innovators they nevertheless are
likely to be technically sophisticated.2 30 As a result, all types of parties who are
interested in hiring patent practitioners can assess with relative speed and ease the
extent to which technical expertise is necessary. In contrast, many parties in the
USPTO are not legally trained and thus may seek representatives with more robust
legal training, that is, a lawyer rather than a patent agent.
This proposal for expanding the Patent Bar would also help to maintain
the quality of service offered by members of the Patent Bar. To start, all
practitioners would possess ophisticated training in areas potentially relevant to
226. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text (discussing certification).
228. As argued above, it is not clear whether the current regime effectively helps
clients identify practitioners with appropriate backgrounds. See supra Section II.B. The
proposed expansion to the Patent Bar will not help clients make such technical selections,
but also will not worsen matters.
229. As noted earlier, restrictive occupational licensing is more likely to be
economically justified when customers lack the expertise required to evaluate the
qualifications of services providers. See supra notes 52, 60 and accompanying text
(discussing the role of expertise in occupational licensing).
230. See Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (noting
that "inventors are typically persons skilled in the field of the invention").
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patent representation in the USPTO. All patent agents would continue to possess
technical or scientific training, as would any lawyers designated as
Science/Technology Specialists.2 3 1 For lawyers who lack such certification, Patent
Bar membership would guarantee the possession of valuable training because, as
explained previously, legal expertise has become important in many aspects of
patent matters in the USPTO.2 32
Existing laws would also dissuade nontechnical lawyers from
representing clients when they are unqualified. Rule 1.1 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, which has been adopted in all 50 states and the District of
Columbia, provides as follows: "A lawyer shall provide competent representation
to a client. Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."2 3 3 The
comments to the Rule further clarify that in assessing whether a lawyer has
violated the rule, "relevant factors include . . . the specialized nature of the
matter."2 34 Similarly, the USPTO promulgates rules of professional conduct that
apply to all members of the Patent Bar and that specify "the minimum level of
conduct below which no practitioner can fall without being subject to disciplinary
action."2 3 5 One of these rules provides that a practitioner "shall not ... handle a
legal matter which the practitioner knows or should know that the practitioner is
not competent to handle, without associating with . . . another practitioner who is
competent to handle it." 236
In a sense, the proposed expansion of the Patent Bar is already at work in
the context of patent litigation, where district courts do not require that attorneys
possess technical credentials to represent patent owners or accused infringers.
Instead, to understand the technology, attorneys often rely on technical experts and
their clients. With in-depth experience in both patent law and clients' technologies,
some attorneys who are not members of the Patent Bar are thus well-suited to
representing parties in the USPTO. For instance, when administrative proceedings
in the USPTO involve the technology that has been the subject of district court
litigation, a party might prefer to hire the same lawyer as lead counsel in the
USPTO even if he or she is not a member of the Patent Bar.23 7 Under the current
231. But see supra Section II.B (arguing that Patent Bar membership provides
little assurance of technical qualification).
232. See supra Section I.D.
233. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983); see also
Am. BAR. ASS'N., State Adoption of the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/professional responsibility/publications/model rules o
f professional_conduct/alpha list state adopting model rules.html (last visited Mar. 6,
2017) (listing the dates that jurisdictions adopted the Model Rules of Professional
Responsibility).
234. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 cmt. (AM. BAR Ass'N 1983).
235. Changes to the Representation of Others Before the United States Patent
Trademark Office, 78 FR 20180-01 (Apr. 3,2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. §10.20).
236. Id. (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 10.77).
237. See supra note 185 (discussing stay provisions).
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structure of the Patent Bar, however, such a party would have no choice but to hire
separate lead counsel for each matter.2 38
Because this proposal would ensure that members of the Patent Bar can
effectively assist innovators in the USPTO, the proposal would not conflict with
existing statutes or regulations regarding the Patent Bar. For example, § 2 of the
Patent Act grants the USPTO the authority to regulate the Patent Bar but does not
address technical backgrounds.2 39 Instead, this statutory provision requires only
that members of the Patent Bar possess "the necessary qualifications to render to
applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and assistance."240 In federal
regulations passed pursuant to this statutory grant of authority, the USPTO
requires that an applicant to the Patent Bar demonstrate that he or she "[p]ossesses
the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications" but only those that are "necessary
for him or her to render applicants valuable service."24 1 As discussed above,
legally sophisticated lawyers who lack substantial technical education could, in
many cases, provide valuable service in representing parties in patent matters in
the USPTO.2 42 Indeed, for many years the USPTO relied only on the Patent Bar
exam to assess the qualifications of lawyers, not educational backgrounds.2 43 Only
the General Requirements Bulletin stands in the way of this proposal, as it
establishes the highly specific, technical-education requirement.2"
B. Previous Challenges to the Bulletin
In the past, there have been a handful of attempts to expand in limited
respects the backgrounds deemed acceptable by the USPTO for admission to the
Patent Bar under the Bulletin. One of the earliest challenges was brought in 1962
in the case of Gager v. Ladd.2 45 There, John Gager applied to take the Patent Bar
exam, but the USPTO rejected his application because he lacked the scientific and
technical training required by the 1962 version of the Bulletin.2 46 Gager appealed
to the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia arguing that his application
should not be governed by the demanding specifics of the Bulletin and instead
should be evaluated under the broader standard described in federal regulations
that an applicant to the Patent Bar possess "the legal, scientific, and technical
qualifications necessary for him or her to render applicants valuable service."2 47 In
evaluating Gager's argument, the court held that the USPTO's reliance on the
238. 37 C.F.R. § 42.10(a), (c) (2017).
239. 35 U.S.C. § 2(b)(2)(D) (2012).
240. Id.
241. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(a)(ii) (2017).
242. See supra notes 220-222 and accompanying text.
243. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
244. See GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4-8.
245. 212 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1963). Gager was not a lawyer. Id. at 671.
246. Id. at 672. At that time, the technical-education requirement in the Bulletin
was, in some respects, less exclusionary than it is today. For instance, in 1962, an applicant
needed only to have a degree in "engineering or physical science" rather than a degree in
one of 32 enumerated majors. Compare id. at 673, with GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN,
supra note 20, at 4.
247. Gager, 212 F. Supp. at 672-73.
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Bulletin was lawful so long as it was not "arbitrary and capricious."248 Under this
deferential standard of review, the court supported the USPTO's reliance on the
Bulletin, finding with little explanation that he educational requirements in the
Bulletin were "reasonable."2 49
Direct challenges to the substance of the Bulletin are thus difficult
because courts examine only whether the Bulletin is arbitrary or capricious.2 50
Consequently, some applicants attempted to challenge the Bulletin through
procedural avenues, like the Administrative Procedures Act ("APA"). One such
challenge occurred in 1990 when Phillip Premysler applied to take the Patent Bar
Exam, but the USPTO rejected Premysler's application because he lacked any of
the backgrounds listed in the Bulletin.2 5 1 Thereafter, Premysler went back to
school to take sufficient credits to qualify to sit for the Patent Bar Exam.2 52 By
1993, he was ready to take the exam. However, in the interim the USPTO
amended the Bulletin so that when Premysler reapplied to take the Patent Bar
exam, the USPTO once again rejected his application.2 5 3 After unsuccessfully
appealing the rejection within the USPTO to the Director of the Office of
Enrollment and Discipline, Premysler brought suit in the U.S. District Court for
the District of Columbia.2 54 Premysler argued that USPTO's reliance on the
Bulletin failed to satisfy the notice-and-comment requirements of the APA, which
state that an administrative agency cannot promulgate regulations without first
providing public notice of the proposed regulations and allowing interested
stakeholders to submit comments.2 5 5 In response, the Commissioner of the USPTO
argued that the Bulletin was "merely an interpretation of the agency's regulations"
and not a formal regulation subject to the APA. 2 56 As a matter of agency
discretion, such "interpretive rules" and "general statements of policy" are not
subject to the APA's notice-and-comment requirements.2 57 The district court and
ultimately the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit agreed with the
USPTO's characterization of the Bulletin.2 5 8
248. Id. at 673.
249. Id. The court further noted that the requirements of the Bulletin were
"reasonable" because a technical degree was not strictly required if an applicant to the
Patent Bar demonstrated "a long apprenticeship under a registered patent attorney or agent."
Id. But see Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1134 (criticizing the use of rational-basis review
for some occupational-licensing schemes).
250. Premysler v. Lehman, Civ. A. No. 94-0937, 1994 WL 776982, at *3 (D.D.C.
1994), aff'd, 71 F.3d 387 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Maresca v. Comm'r of Patents & Trademarks,
871 F. Supp. 504, 507 (D.D.C. 1994), aff'd, 56 F.3d 80 (Fed. Cir. 1995); Gager, 212 F.
Supp. at 673; Premysler, 1994 WL 776982, at *3.
251. Premysler, 71 F.3d at 388.
252. Id. at 389.
253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Premysler, 1994 WL 776982, at *3; see also 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012).
256. Premysler, 1994 WL 776982, at *3.
257. 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(a) (2012).
258. Premysler, 71 F.3d at 390. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently held that an
agency need not be subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking when promulgating an
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The Bulletin is thus doubly difficult to challenge because the USPTO has
broad discretion regarding the substance of the technical-education requirement
and because the public has no right to comment on the Office's use of that
discretion. Having few rights, some members of the public have petitioned the
USPTO to consider revising the Bulletin as a matter of administrative discretion.
For example, in 1989 the Computer Law Committee of the American Bar
Association passed, by a near-unanimous vote, a resolution encouraging the Patent
Bar to expand the technical-education requirement to include computer science
degrees.2 59 Thereafter, the committee wrote the Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks, advocating that Patent Bar eligibility requirements be amended. The
Commissioner efused.260
Eventually, the USPTO did amend the Bulletin to add computer science
to the list of degrees that satisfy the technical-education requirement. However,
unlike the other qualifying degrees, the USPTO added-with little explanation-
an additional requirement for computer science graduates: a computer science
degree would only qualify a person to take the Patent Bar exam if the computer
science program was specially accredited at the time that their degrees were
awarded.2 61 As a result, many computer science graduates remain ineligible to join
the Patent Bar.
Seeking to change this unusual limitation, a computer science professor
and a patent law professor petitioned the USPTO in 2006 to conduct "notice and
comment rulemaking to amplify the legal, scientific, and technical qualifications
sufficient to sit for the [e]xamination for registration to [p]ractice before the
[USPTO]." 262 The professors noted that the Federal Circuit held in Premysler that
the Bulletin was not subject to notice-and-comment rulemaking, but nevertheless
argued that notice and comment were appropriate, in part, because the USPTO
"has often conducted notice and comment [rulemaking] even for exempt rules."263
In response to the petition, however, the USPTO asserted once again that notice-
and-comment procedures do not apply to "interpretive rules" and otherwise
declined to initiate a process that would allow interested members of the public to
provide feedback on the technical-education requirement.2 6
interpretive rule that substantially departs from an earlier interpretive rule. Perez v. Mortg.
Bankers Ass'n, 135 S. Ct. 1199, 1200 (2015).
259. Burke & Field, supra note 27, at 157-58.
260. Id.
261. GENERAL REQUIREMENTS BULLETIN, supra note 20, at 4; see supra note 120
and accompanying text (noting that computer science majors from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology who graduated before 1996 are ineligible to join the Patent Bar).
262. Thomas G. Field, Jr., Administrative Procedure Act Rule-Making Petition,
4-5 (Feb. 3, 2006), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid= 192402.
263. Id. at 3.
264. Letter from James A. Toupin, Gen. Counsel, USPTO, to Thomas G. Field,




C Explaining USPTO Reluctance
Thus far, the USPTO has been reluctant to loosen the technical-education
requirement or even to provide members of the public with a meaningful
opportunity to comment on this issue. The USPTO's actions are difficult to justify.
Allowing more public input regarding the technical-education requirement would
not undermine the USPTO's capacity to effectively regulate patent practitioners.
To the contrary, gathering more information about the effects of the technical-
education requirement likely would help the USPTO to develop effective policy.
Moreover, as described above, the technical-education requirement is subject to
critique, and there may be substantial benefits to expanding the Patent Bar.2 65
Indeed, closer scrutiny of the USPTO's explanations for its actions
further deepens the mystery surrounding its behavior. For example, in refusing the
2006 request for notice-and-comment review of the technical-education
requirement, the USPTO asserted that such an approach would lead to "rigid rules"
that fail to account for the "constantly changing nature of invention."2 66 In
actuality, however, notice-and-comment rulemaking would not lead to any more
"rigid rules" than the current approach. To start, the Bulletin already limits the
range of backgrounds that satisfy the technical-education requirement in a fashion
that conflicts with the "constantly changing nature of invention." For instance,
business and design majors generally cannot join the Patent Bar even though the
USPTO frequently issues business method and design patents.2 67 In addition, even
if some members of the public advocated for "rigid rules," the USPTO would not
be required to accept those recommendations. When proposed regulations are
subject to notice and comment, the APA requires only that an agency consider the
information provided by the public and provide "a concise general statement of [a
rule's] basis and purpose."268
Perhaps a more coherent explanation of the USPTO's reluctance to
expand the Patent Bar stems from the financial self-interest of many of its
employees. As described above, one effect of the technical-education requirement
is to limit supply in the labor market for representation in the USPTO, which in
turn reduces competition in that market.2 69 Employees of the USPTO often benefit
directly from this restriction of competition because many of them leave the
USPTO to become patent agents and attorneys in the private sector. In fact, there
has long been a close connection between the USPTO and the Patent Bar. By one
1934 estimate, as many as half of all patent attorneys began their careers as patent
examiners.27
265. See supra Section IIA.
266. Letter from James A. Toupin, supra note 264, at 2.
267. See supra Section II.B.1.
268. 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (2012).
269. See supra Section II.C (discussing the typical costs and benefits of the
technical-education requirement).
270. Lee R. Schermerhorn, Law, and the Patent Examiner, 16 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y
751, 751 (1934); see also Edwin W. Teale, The Patent Office Has Become a National
Disgrace, POPULAR SCIENCE, June 1930, at 132 (noting that many patent examiners consider
employment at the USPTO to be a "stepping-stone to a career in.. .patent law").
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Today, many examiners continue to leave the USPTO for the higher
salaries available in private practice. Indeed, USPTO regulations explicitly support
patent examiners launching careers in private practice in that patent examiners
who have performed satisfactorily for as little as two fiscal years can join the
Patent Bar automatically after leaving their government posts without taking the
Patent Bar exam.2 71 As a result, expanding the Patent Bar would reduce the future
economic prospects of many USPTO employees. Moreover, lucrative private
industry salaries also help to maintain higher salaries in the USPTO because, to
retain experienced patent examiners, the USPTO must offer government salaries
and benefits that compete with opportunities in the private sector. Even employees
that plan to stay at the USPTO thus face incentives to support a restrictive
technical-education requirement.2 72
D. Paths Forward
One path to implementing the proposed reform is to revisit the avenues
previously pursued by challengers to the Patent Bar. For instance, a person denied
entrance into the Patent Bar could assert that the Bulletin violates the APA because
it was promulgated without notice and comment. This argument failed in the past
because the USPTO successfully argued to courts that the technical-education
requirement was not part of a regulation and instead was merely a nonbinding
"statement of policy."2 73 In actuality, however, administrative decisions within the
USPTO belie its claim that the standards of the Bulletin are nonbinding policy
statements. A person seeking to take the Patent Bar exam must submit an
application to the Director of Enrollment and Discipline, who reviews the
applications to determine, inter alia, whether the applicant possesses " ufficient
basic training in scientific and technical matters.1"274 'When the Director rejects an
application, an applicant can appeal this decision to the Commissioner of Patent
and Trademarks, and the USPTO makes some of these materials available to the
public through its website.2 75 In all of the decisions disclosed on the USPTO
271. 37 C.F.R. § 11.7(d)(1)(iii) (2017). The USPTO requires that examiners
satisfy the technical-education requirement before being hired. Burke & Field, supra note
27, at 158; see also Patent Examiner Positions, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF.,
https://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/exam.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2017) (stating that
patent examiners must have "knowledge in one or more disciplines-biology, chemistry,
physics, chemical engineering, electrical engineering, mechanical engineering, computer
engineering, or computer science").
272. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "active market participants cannot be
allowed to regulate their own markets" without potentially engaging in conduct that harms
consumers. N.C. State Bd. of Dental Examiners v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101, 1111 (2015); see
also Edlin & Haw, supra note 29, at 1103-04 (noting that licensing boards with financial
interests in limiting competition "often succumb to the temptation of self-dealing, creating
regulations to insulate incumbents rather than to ensure public welfare").
273. Premysler v. Lehman, 71 F.3d 387, 389 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
274. Changes to the Representation of Others Before the United States Patent
Trademark Office, 78 FR 20180-01 (Apr. 3, 2013) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. § 10.7).
275. Id. (codified at 37 C.F.R. 10.2(c)); OED Reading Room, USPTO, http://e-
foia.uspto.gov/Foia/OEDReadingRoom.jsp (last visited Mar. 6, 2017) (selecting
"Technical" for "Decision type).
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website in which an application was rejected for failure to satisfy the Bulletin, the
Commissioner of Patents affirmed the decision of the Office of Enrollment and
Discipline.2 76 In other words, while the USPTO claims that the Bulletin is
nonbinding, there do not appear to have been any instances where it actually
departed from the details of the Bulletin.
Nevertheless, existing precedent supporting the USPTO's discretion in
establishing the contours of the technical-education requirement may prove
insurmountable. Debunking the USPTO's claim that the technical-education
requirement in the Bulletin is nonbinding, and thus not subject to the APA, may be
difficult given that the USPTO has consistently claimed to have discretion to
depart from the Bulletin-even if it has not exercised it.
Moreover, even if the USPTO engaged in notice-and-comment
rulemaking, it might simply reenact a requirement for Patent Bar members to
possess technical educations, particularly because many current members of the
Patent Bar would have an incentive to advocate for such a requirement. By
limiting the supply of legal services in patent matters in the USPTO, the technical-
education requirement increases the profits of those who are able to join the Patent
Bar. For their part, many current employees of the USPTO would be inclined to
embrace the self-interested recommendations of the existing Patent Bar given the
economic kinship between the Patent Bar and USPTO employees.2 7 7
As a result of these barriers to reform, lobbying may be needed. Of
course, existing organizations for patent practitioners, such as the American
Intellectual Property Lawyers Association, are unlikely to take up this charge, as it
would increase the competition facing current Patent Bar members. An
organization with members who are lawyers but not patent practitioners, such as
the American Bar Association, would thus be more likely to spearhead this reform
effort. Indeed, the ABA recently focused on programs to expand access to legal
services. Much of this effort involves proposals to allow nonlawyers to represent
clients in certain legal matters.2 78 Ironically, the ABA has overlooked an
opportunity to advocate for lawyers themselves to expand access to legal services
in the USPTO. Congress may also be receptive to expansions to the Patent Bar
because it could reduce the financial barriers facing innovators to utilizing the
patent system, thereby promoting innovation. Moreover, the proposed expansion
of the Patent Bar could improve the USPTO's capacity to retain examiners by
reducing the advantages of the private sector that stem from reduced competition.
CONCLUSION
The U.S. Constitution provides that the primary goal of patent law is to
"promote the progress.. of the useful Arts."2 79 To do so, lawmakers and scholars
276. OED Reading Room, supra note 275.
277. See supra Section II.C.
278. ABA COMM'N ON THE FUTURE OF LEGAL SERVS., ISSUES PAPER CONCERNING
NEW CATEGORIES OF LEGAL SERVICE PROVIDERS 7-11 (Oct. 16, 2015),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/images/officepresident/delivery of legal se
rvices completed evaluation.pdf.
279. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
428 [VOL. 59:383
RAZING THE PATENT BAR
endeavor to craft patent laws that maximize social welfare, and consequently
assess the efficacy of different facets of patent law by weighing the attendant costs
and benefits. For instance, commentators typically evaluate proposed patent
reforms that raise the costs of acquiring patents to determine if those reforms
provide sufficient offsetting benefits.280 Surprisingly, although innovators spend
billions of dollars each year on representation in the USPTO, this cost-benefit
approach has not been applied to the structure of the Patent Bar. Moreover, in the
absence of market failures, both legal and economic scholars generally agree that
free-market competition is more economically efficient than occupational
licensing.281 At least for nontechnical lawyers, however, the technical-education
requirement of the Patent Bar has not been and cannot be justified by such market
failures.
To the contrary, the technical-education requirement as currently
constituted is restricting market forces to the detriment of society. It artificially
limits the supply of labor in the service market for patent representation in the
USPTO, thereby reducing competition and raising prices. This market intervention
is particularly restrictive in fields that are eligible for patent protection, like
designs and business methods, but for which undergraduate degrees in those fields
do not satisfy the technical-education requirement. Similarly, the effect of the
technical-education requirement is particularly concerning regarding legal
expertise because fewer people have training in both disciplines, yet the demand
for legal expertise in the USPTO has grown, as patent matters in the USPTO have
become more legally complex.
At the same time, the technical-education requirement provides few
market benefits-if any-when it excludes lawyers from the Patent Bar. Critically,
Patent Bar membership provides little information or assurance of technical
sophistication. USPTO regulations allow members of the Patent Bar to work on
matters unrelated to the technical educations that initially supported their
membership. Many consumers consequently select representation in the USPTO
based on individual qualifications of agents and attorneys, rather than simply their
membership in the Patent Bar. For most parties seeking representation in the
USPTO, this selection is not difficult as they are technically sophisticated and
therefore can cheaply and accurately assess the technical qualifications of others.
The expansion to the Patent Bar proposed in this Article-allowing
lawyers to take the Patent Bar exam regardless of their technical backgrounds and
certifying appropriate lawyers as Science/Technology Specialists-would allow
280. E.g., F. Scott Kieff, The Case for Registering Patents and the Law and
Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining Rules, 45 B.C. L. REv. 55, 110 (2003) (arguing that
the cost to patentees of improved drafting "are substantially less than those associated with
litigating"); Scott Miller, Enhancing Patent Disclosure for Faithful Claim Construction, 9
LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 177, 196, 204 (2005) (noting that "it would of course be foolish to
mandate new disclosure rules so exacting that the increased cost of patent preparation
swamps any predictability benefit that the changes would produce."); Kelly Casey Mullally,
Patent Hermeneutics: Form and Substance in Claim Construction, 59 FLA. L. REv. 333, 380
(2007) (arguing that the cost of increased disclosure in patents may be "offset in the
avoidance of greater costs to the public and the avoidance of litigation").
281. See supra Section IIB.
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the market for services in the USPTO to operate more freely, thereby reducing the
cost of the technical-education requirement. Reforming the Patent Bar will,
however, be difficult. Existing members of the Patent Bar enjoy its restrictive
nature and therefore may oppose efforts to increase competition. Moreover,
because of the close connection between the USPTO and the Patent Bar, many
employees of the USPTO face similar economic incentives to oppose expansions
to the Patent Bar. Congressional intervention may be required, perhaps with the
support of lobbying by nontechnical lawyers who would benefit from the proposed
expansion to the Patent Bar.
